Free ECCouncil 312-50v13 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 14

The correct answer is A. Wrapper.

A wrapper binds a malicious payload to a legitimate executable so that both run when the user opens the file. The user sees the expected legitimate application, while the hidden malicious payload executes in the background.

CEH Trojan material explains that a wrapper attaches an executable application to a Trojan executable, wraps both programs into a single file, and causes the Trojan to install while the user only sees the legitimate application running . Another CEH reference defines a wrapper as a non-malicious file that binds the malicious file to propagate the Trojan and avoid detection .

Option B. Downloader is incorrect because a downloader retrieves malware from a remote location after execution.

Option C. Packer is incorrect because a packer compresses or obfuscates executable code to make detection harder.

Option D. Dropper is incorrect because a dropper is designed to deliver or install malware onto the victim system, but the key behavior here is binding a malicious payload with a legitimate executable.

Therefore, the best answer is A. Wrapper.

The correct answer is D. Botnet Agents.

The scenario describes multiple infected machines that periodically contact a central command server, receive instructions, and generate coordinated traffic when directed. These compromised systems are functioning as botnet agents, also called bots or zombies.

CEH-aligned DoS/DDoS material explains that a botnet is typically created by installing a bot on a victim system using a Trojan horse. Once executed, the victim system becomes infected and waits for instructions from a command-and-control handler. The handler then sends instructions to infected systems to perform attacks . Another reference explains that botnets are networks of hacked machines controlled remotely without the owners’ knowledge and used like an army to launch attacks against targets .

Option A. Spyware is incorrect because spyware primarily gathers user activity or sensitive data.

Option B. Scareware is incorrect because scareware tricks users with fake warnings to make them install software or pay for fraudulent services.

Option C. Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) is incorrect because PUAs may be unwanted or intrusive, but they do not necessarily act as remotely controlled attack agents.

Option D. Botnet Agents is correct because the infected endpoints receive commands from a central controller and participate in coordinated activity.

Therefore, the best answer is D. Botnet Agents.

The most direct technique demonstrated is D. Compromising secrets, because the attackers abused exposed API keys to authenticate to the cloud provider and execute unauthorized cloud commands. In CEH-aligned cloud attack paths, “secrets” commonly include API keys, access tokens, secret keys, passwords, certificates, and service account credentials. When these secrets are exposed (for example, hard-coded in source code, leaked in public repositories, stored insecurely in endpoints, or logged accidentally), an attacker can use them to gain the same privileges as the legitimate account or service identity.

Once valid API keys are obtained, attackers typically perform actions consistent with the compromised identity’s permissions: spinning up compute, modifying IAM policies, accessing storage, disabling logging, creating new credentials, and pivoting across services. The incident description mentions both resource abuse and lateral movement. Resource abuse is a frequent consequence of stolen cloud credentials because attackers can provision infrastructure on the victim’s account (often for botnets, staging, or other activities). Lateral movement inside the cloud environment can happen when the compromised keys grant access to additional services or when the attacker uses the initial foothold to discover and access other roles, instances, or secrets (for example, by querying metadata services, reading configuration stores, or enumerating IAM privileges).

Why the other options are less accurate: Cryptojacking specifically refers to illicit cryptocurrency mining using hijacked resources; while “resource abuse” could include mining, the key distinguishing factor in the question is the use of exposed API keys to issue commands, which is fundamentally credential/secret compromise. Enumerating S3 buckets is a reconnaissance activity focused on object storage discovery and misconfigurations, not the central mechanism here. A wrapping attack relates to specific cloud/identity token wrapping scenarios and is not indicated by exposed API keys.

Therefore, the incident most clearly demonstrates compromising secrets (exposed API keys).

The correct answer is A. ms-sql-m because TCP/1434 is commonly associated with Microsoft SQL Server Monitor / SQL Server Browser–related services, which are used to help clients discover SQL Server instances and their connection details. In standardized service naming, ms-sql-m corresponds to Microsoft SQL “monitor” functionality tied to instance discovery and related metadata exposure. When this port is reachable from networks where it is not needed, it can increase attack surface by exposing information that helps attackers identify database instances, target the correct ports, and focus exploitation attempts.

In the context of a legacy server that is “not listed in the company’s active inventory,” an open 1434 is a red flag because it suggests an unnecessary or unmanaged database discovery component may be running. Attackers often use exposed database-related ports for reconnaissance (identifying instance names, versions, and listening endpoints) and then pivot to authentication attacks or exploitation of known weaknesses. Even when the core SQL service port is controlled, discovery services can still leak useful environment details that lower the cost of an attack.

Why the other options are incorrect:

ms-sql-s typically refers to the primary Microsoft SQL Server service, most commonly associated with TCP/1433 (the default SQL Server port), not 1434.

sql*net is associated with Oracle SQL*Net/Net8 traffic, typically using Oracle listener ports such as 1521, not 1434.

sqlsrv is not the standardized assignment for 1434 in the way ms-sql-m/ms-sql-s are used for Microsoft SQL-related services.

Therefore, based on standardized port associations and the database discovery/monitoring role of this service, the exposure most likely indicates ms-sql-m on TCP/1434, and it warrants further review and potential restriction if not required.

The correct answer is B. BitLocker Drive Encryption because the requirements describe native Windows full-disk encryption that integrates tightly with enterprise Windows security features and centralized management. BitLocker is Microsoft’s built-in disk encryption technology designed to provide transparent encryption for the operating system volume and additional fixed/removable drives. It supports hardware-backed startup protection through integration with the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which can help protect encryption keys and validate boot integrity before unlocking the OS volume. This matches the prompt’s requirement for “hardware-backed startup protection.”

The scenario also emphasizes “centralized key escrow via Active Directory/management policies.” In enterprise deployments, BitLocker recovery information can be backed up to Active Directory and managed through Group Policy / MDM controls, enabling standardized enforcement (encryption settings, recovery key handling, compliance reporting) across servers and endpoints. This is a core operational advantage in regulated environments like healthcare: it enables rapid response (recoverability), consistent policy application, and audit-friendly control of encryption keys—without requiring third-party key management tooling for basic escrow needs.

Additionally, the prompt calls for securing the “system partition and attached data volumes” in a way that is compatible with Windows platform behavior and minimizes disruption. BitLocker supports encrypting both the OS volume and data volumes, and it is designed for transparent operation once enabled, so normal server use and domain authentication continue as expected.

Why the other options are not correct: FileVault is Apple’s full-disk encryption for macOS, not Windows. VeraCrypt and Rohos Disk Encryption are third-party solutions that can provide disk encryption, but they do not match the stated preference for deep Windows enterprise integration with TPM-based startup protection and Active Directory–based recovery key escrow through standard Microsoft management policies.

Therefore, the best solution for this Windows enterprise requirement is BitLocker Drive Encryption.

This scenario clearly describes Load Balancing as a DDoS mitigation strategy, which is covered under the CEH v13 Network and Perimeter Hacking module. Load balancing distributes incoming network or application traffic across multiple servers or resources to prevent any single system from becoming overwhelmed.

According to CEH v13, modern DDoS mitigation architectures often combine hardware load balancers with cloud-based scrubbing centers or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). These systems absorb high traffic volumes and ensure availability by spreading requests across multiple nodes. This approach aligns perfectly with the organization’s strategy of absorbing and distributing traffic rather than blocking it outright.

Other options are incorrect:

Black hole routing drops all traffic, including legitimate traffic.

Rate limiting restricts traffic volume rather than distributing it.

Sinkholing redirects traffic for analysis, not load distribution.

The correct answer is C. MAC Flooding.

The scenario describes a switched network beginning to behave like a hub, with frames appearing across multiple switch ports. This happens when the switch’s CAM table is overwhelmed with many fake MAC address entries. Once the CAM table cannot reliably map destination MAC addresses to ports, the switch floods traffic out multiple ports.

CEH sniffing material explains that MAC flooding sends random MAC addresses mapped with random IP addresses to overflow the CAM table. When the CAM table is full, the switch acts like a hub and broadcasts packets to all ports, helping the attacker sniff packets more easily . Another CEH-aligned exam guide states that MAC flooding sends so many MAC addresses to the CAM table that it cannot keep up, effectively turning the switch into a hub .

Option A. Switch Port Stealing is incorrect because switch port stealing targets a specific victim MAC-to-port mapping through a race condition.

Option B. ARP Poisoning is incorrect because ARP poisoning manipulates ARP caches to redirect traffic through the attacker.

Option D. DNS Poisoning is incorrect because DNS poisoning manipulates name resolution, not switch forwarding behavior.

Therefore, the best answer is C. MAC Flooding.

Client-side controls, such as JavaScript validation and CAPTCHA enforcement, are explicitly described in CEH v13 as inherently untrustworthy, since they run on the user’s device. The most effective way to bypass them is by intercepting and modifying HTTP requests after client-side validation but before server-side processing.

Using a proxy tool (such as Burp Suite) allows the tester to manipulate parameters invisibly, without disabling JavaScript or injecting code that could raise alarms. This makes Option B the most stealthy and effective method.

Disabling JavaScript (Option A) is noisy and easily detected. Injecting JavaScript (Option C) may trigger client-side protections. Reverse-engineering encryption (Option D) is complex and unnecessary.

CEH v13 emphasizes proxy-based manipulation as the preferred technique for bypassing client-side security mechanisms. Therefore, Option B is correct.

In CEH v13 Information Security and Ethical Hacking Overview, script kiddies are defined as individuals with limited technical knowledge who rely on pre-written tools, scripts, and exploits created by others to carry out attacks. They typically lack a deep understanding of how the underlying exploits work.

CEH v13 categorizes attackers based on skill level and intent. Script kiddies sit at the lower end of the skill spectrum. They often download exploit kits, automated scanners, or attack frameworks and run them with minimal customization. While their attacks may be unsophisticated, they can still cause damage due to the availability of powerful tools.

Option B accurately reflects this definition. Options A and D describe skilled attackers or programmers, which contradicts the CEH classification. Option C is incorrect because ethical hackers use tools responsibly with authorization and possess a strong understanding of security principles.

CEH v13 emphasizes that although script kiddies are less skilled, they pose a risk because automation allows them to exploit known vulnerabilities at scale. This is why organizations must patch systems promptly and implement baseline security controls.

Thus, Option B is the correct answer.

The behavior described most closely matches an Eclipse attack. In an eclipse attack, an adversary isolates a victim node by controlling its peer connections so that the node communicates only with attacker-controlled (or attacker-influenced) peers. Once isolated, the attacker can feed the victim a manipulated view of the blockchain—such as withholding blocks, delaying transactions, or presenting an alternative chain history. This can enable downstream impacts like double-spending against merchants who rely on that node’s view for confirmation.

The scenario’s strongest indicators are:

The node “received blocks only from a small, fixed set of peers for several hours,” suggesting abnormal peer diversity and potential isolation.

The attacker “controlled which peers that node communicated with,” which is essentially the definition of eclipsing a node.

The node “accepted a conflicting history” and the attacker supplied “a private chain until they were ready to reveal it,” consistent with feeding the victim a tailored chain view and then releasing/realigning it to profit from reversed payments.

Why the other options are less fitting:

A Finney attack (A) involves a miner pre-mining a block containing a spend, making a payment to a merchant, and then releasing the pre-mined block to invalidate the merchant’s transaction—this doesn’t require isolating a specific node’s peers for hours.

A DeFi sandwich attack (B) is a mempool/MEV tactic on decentralized exchanges involving front-running and back-running, unrelated to isolating node peer connections or feeding a private chain.

A 51% attack (C) involves controlling a majority of network hash power/stake to rewrite history at network scale. The scenario emphasizes isolation of a particular merchant-related node via peer control rather than majority network control.

Therefore, the attack is best identified as D. Eclipse Attack.

The scenario describes the reuse of stolen Kerberos tickets to authenticate to other domain systems without cracking anything and without needing the user’s plaintext password. That behavior aligns directly with a Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) attack. In Kerberos-based environments (such as Active Directory domains), authentication relies on tickets (for example, Ticket Granting Tickets and service tickets). If an attacker can obtain valid ticket material from a compromised host—commonly from memory, credential caches, or ticket stores—they can present (“pass”) the ticket to access services as that user, as long as the ticket is still valid and accepted by the target service.

The key clues are: (1) Devon “intercepts Kerberos authentication material,” (2) “instead of cracking the data, he reuses the stolen tickets,” and (3) he authenticates “directly to other systems within the domain” to access resources. This is the essential advantage of PtT: it bypasses password guessing or hash cracking by leveraging the fact that possession of a valid ticket can be enough to authenticate to services (file shares, application servers, and other Kerberos-protected resources).

The question also rules out common alternatives:

Kerberoasting (C) involves requesting service tickets for SPNs and then offline cracking the encrypted portion to recover service account passwords. Devon is explicitly not cracking anything.

Pass-the-Hash (D) is an NTLM-based technique that reuses NTLM hashes to authenticate. The scenario explicitly states “No NTLM hashes.”

LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning (A) is a name-resolution poisoning technique used to capture/relay credentials on a local network. The scenario states no broadcast poisoning was involved and focuses instead on Kerberos ticket reuse.

Therefore, Devon most likely performed B. Pass-the-Ticket Attack.

CEH v13 states that vulnerabilities with a CVSS score ≥ 9.0 are critical and require immediate containment. When remote code execution is possible, the system may already be compromised.

The recommended response is to isolate the affected system, preventing lateral movement, then perform a forensic audit before applying patches. Immediate patching without isolation may alert attackers or destroy evidence.

Thus, option D aligns with CEH incident response best practices.

According to CEH v13 Network Scanning Techniques, a FIN scan is a stealth scanning method that sends TCP packets with only the FIN flag set. Its behavior relies on RFC 793, which specifies that closed ports must respond with a TCP RST, while open ports should silently drop the packet.

However, modern firewalls, IDS/IPS systems, and hardened TCP/IP stacks often filter or silently drop FIN packets regardless of port state. Therefore, when a FIN scan results in no response from a large number of ports, it does not conclusively indicate that the ports are open. Instead, CEH v13 stresses that this behavior commonly points to packet filtering by firewalls or security controls.

Option A is incorrect because a lack of response does not definitively mean ports are closed. Option B is an overreaction; stealth scan anomalies alone do not indicate a breach. Option C is unlikely because congestion would impact multiple protocols, not selectively suppress FIN responses.

CEH v13 recommends that when FIN scans produce ambiguous results, analysts should correlate findings using additional scan types (such as SYN scans) and investigate firewall rules and filtering behavior. Thus, option D is the most accurate interpretation and aligns with CEH guidance.

The tool described is most consistent with Bettercap. Bettercap is a lightweight, extensible framework commonly used in controlled security testing for man-in-the-middle (MITM) operations on local networks. It supports ARP spoofing/ARP poisoning to position the attacker between victims and gateways, enabling interception of traffic. It also supports DNS manipulation/spoofing (e.g., redirecting domain lookups to attacker-controlled destinations) and packet injection capabilities for modifying or inserting traffic. Importantly, it provides an interactive interface that allows real-time session visibility and control, which matches the scenario’s emphasis on interactive monitoring while intercepting internal web application traffic.

The objective described—capturing and manipulating session tokens in transit—is consistent with a MITM platform that can observe HTTP traffic (or influence traffic where TLS is not properly enforced or where testing includes trusted certificates in a lab). Bettercap’s design as an “all-in-one” local network attack and monitoring tool makes it a typical choice for demonstrating risks from weak network segmentation, insecure DNS, lack of HTTPS/HSTS, or insufficient endpoint protections against ARP spoofing.

Why the other options are less suitable:

Wireshark (A) is primarily a packet analyzer/sniffer; it does not inherently perform ARP spoofing, DNS manipulation, or injection as an active MITM tool.

Hetty (B) and Caido (C) are web-focused interception/testing tools (proxy-style workflows). They can intercept HTTP/S when configured as a proxy, but they do not natively specialize in LAN-layer ARP spoofing and DNS manipulation for transparent MITM in the same way as Bettercap.

Therefore, the most likely tool is D. Bettercap.

The correct answer is A, DNS anomalies. When a compromised endpoint uses DNS queries to communicate with a command-and-control server, the most relevant indicator is abnormal DNS behavior. In CEH-style incident detection, analysts correlate endpoint and network telemetry to identify suspicious communication patterns. DNS-based C2 may appear as repeated beaconing, unusually long domain names, excessive TXT queries, requests to newly registered or suspicious domains, high query volume, or DNS traffic that does not match normal baseline behavior. CEH materials discuss covert tunneling where commands can be hidden inside DNS name lookup query/reply traffic, making it appear like ordinary protocol traffic to network tools. IDS/monitoring concepts also emphasize anomaly detection by comparing activity against a baseline and investigating unusual behavior. Memory leaks, CPU spikes, and disk usage may occur in some malware cases, but they do not specifically indicate DNS-based C2. Therefore, the best indicator for this scenario is DNS anomalies.