Free ECCouncil 312-50v13 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 3

The described attack is a Downgrade Security Attack. In this scenario:

The legitimate client and access point support both WPA2 and WPA3.

The attacker introduces a rogue AP that only supports WPA2.

The victim connects to this rogue AP using WPA2 (less secure) instead of WPA3.

Once downgraded, the attacker captures the handshake and attempts to crack the WPA2 encryption.

This is known as a “Downgrade Attack” or “Downgrade Negotiation Attack,” which exploits backward compatibility in security protocols.

Incorrect Options:

A. Timing-based attacks usually refer to side-channel analysis, not protocol downgrading.

B. Side-channel attacks extract info via timing, power usage, etc., not protocol negotiation.

D. Cache-based attacks exploit memory caching behavior.

Reference – CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 16: Hacking Wireless Networks

Section: “Wireless Encryption Attacks”

Subsection: “Downgrade Attacks (WPA3 to WPA2) and Rogue Access Points”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RADIUS

Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is a networking protocol that provides centralized authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) management for users who connect and use a network service.

RADIUS is a client/server protocol that runs in the application layer, and can use either TCP or UDP. Network access servers, which control access to a network, usually contain a RADIUS client component that communicates with the RADIUS server. RADIUS is often the back-end of choice for 802.1X authentication. A RADIUS server is usually a background process running on UNIX or Microsoft Windows.

Authentication and authorization

The user or machine sends a request to a Network Access Server (NAS) to gain access to a particular network resource using access credentials. The credentials are passed to the NAS device via the link-layer protocol—for example, Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) in the case of many dialup or DSL providers or posted in an HTTPS secure web form.

In turn, the NAS sends a RADIUS Access Request message to the RADIUS server, requesting authorization to grant access via the RADIUS protocol.

This request includes access credentials, typically in the form of username and password or security certificate provided by the user. Additionally, the request may contain other information which the NAS knows about the user, such as its network address or phone number, and information regarding the user's physical point of attachment to the NAS.

The RADIUS server checks that the information is correct using authentication schemes such as PAP, CHAP or EAP. The user's proof of identification is verified, along with, optionally, other information related to the request, such as the user's network address or phone number, account status, and specific network service access privileges. Historically, RADIUS servers checked the user's information against a locally stored flat-file database. Modern RADIUS servers can do this or can refer to external sources—commonly SQL, Kerberos, LDAP, or Active Directory servers—to verify the user's credentials.

The RADIUS server then returns one of three responses to the NAS:

1) Access-Reject,

2) Access-Challenge,

3) Access-Accept.

Access-Reject

The user is unconditionally denied access to all requested network resources. Reasons may include failure to provide proof of identification or an unknown or inactive user account.

Access-Challenge

Requests additional information from the user such as a secondary password, PIN, token, or card. Access-Challenge is also used in more complex authentication dialogs where a secure tunnel is established between the user machine and the Radius Server in a way that the access credentials are hidden from the NAS.

Access-Accept

The user is granted access. Once the user is authenticated, the RADIUS server will often check that the user is authorized to use the network service requested. A given user may be allowed to use a company's wireless network, but not its VPN service, for example. Again, this information may be stored locally on the RADIUS server or may be looked up in an external source such as LDAP or Active Directory.

Developed by Robert “RSnake” Hansen, Slowloris is DDoS attack software that permits one computer to require down an internet server. Due the straightforward yet elegant nature of this attack, it requires minimal bandwidth to implement and affects the target server’s web server only, with almost no side effects on other services and ports.

Slowloris has proven highly-effective against many popular sorts of web server software, including Apache 1.x and 2.x.

Over the years, Slowloris has been credited with variety of high-profile server takedowns. Notably, it had been used extensively by Iranian ‘hackivists’ following the 2009 Iranian presidential election to attack Iranian government internet sites .

Slowloris works by opening multiple connections to the targeted web server and keeping them open as long as possible. It does this by continuously sending partial HTTP requests, none of which are ever completed. The attacked servers open more and connections open, expecting each of the attack requests to be completed.

Periodically, the Slowloris sends subsequent HTTP headers for every request, but never actually completes the request. Ultimately, the targeted server’s maximum concurrent connection pool is filled, and extra (legitimate) connection attempts are denied.

By sending partial, as against malformed, packets, Slowloris can easily elapse traditional Intrusion Detection systems.

Named after a kind of slow-moving Asian primate, Slowloris really does win the race by moving slowly and steadily. A Slowloris attack must await sockets to be released by legitimate requests before consuming them one by one.

For a high-volume internet site , this will take a while . the method are often further slowed if legitimate sessions are reinitiated. But within the end, if the attack is unmitigated, Slowloris—like the tortoise—wins the race.

If undetected or unmitigated, Slowloris attacks also can last for long periods of your time . When attacked sockets outing , Slowloris simply reinitiates the connections, continuing to reach the online server until mitigated.

Designed for stealth also as efficacy, Slowloris are often modified to send different host headers within the event that a virtual host is targeted, and logs are stored separately for every virtual host.

More importantly, within the course of an attack, Slowloris are often set to suppress log file creation. this suggests the attack can catch unmonitored servers off-guard, with none red flags appearing in log file entries.

Methods of mitigation

Imperva’s security services are enabled by reverse proxy technology, used for inspection of all incoming requests on their thanks to the clients’ servers.

Imperva’s secured proxy won’t forward any partial connection requests—rendering all Slowloris DDoS attack attempts completely and utterly useless.

Nmap provides a scripting engine (NSE) that includes a script named http-methods. This script sends OPTIONS requests to the web server to determine which HTTP methods are supported. Identifying risky methods like PUT and DELETE helps detect misconfigured or vulnerable web servers.

Example command:

nmap --script http-methods -p 80

Reference – CEH v13 Official Study Guide:

Module 11: Hacking Web Applications

Quote:

“The Nmap script http-methods helps identify enabled HTTP methods including potentially dangerous ones like PUT and DELETE.”

Incorrect Options Explained:

B. http-enum is used to enumerate directories and applications, not methods.

C. http-headers retrieves HTTP headers.

D. http-git checks for Git repositories on web servers.

===========

In the Windows security model, SID ending in -500 is reserved for the built-in Administrator account. The SID seen in the image:

S-1-5-21-343818398-789336058-1343024091-500 → maps to user Joe

This proves that Joe is the true built-in administrator account on the domain EARTH.

From CEH v13 Courseware:

Module 4: Enumeration

Topic: SID Enumeration and Account Discovery

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“In Windows, the account with RID 500 is always the default Administrator account. Even if renamed, its SID remains ending in -500. Enumeration of this SID allows attackers to identify privileged accounts.”

Incorrect Options:

A: Incomplete — it is not just that Joe has SID 500, but that SID 500 means Joe is the administrator.

B/C: These commands don’t validate Guest account status.

E: Incorrect — these commands explicitly prove administrator identity.

Lock-in reflects the inability of the client to migrate from one CSP to another or in-house systems owing to the lack of tools, procedures, standard data formats, applications, and service portability. This threat is related to the inappropriate selection of a CSP, incomplete and non-transparent terms of use, lack of standard mechanisms, etc. (P.2884/2868)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_twin_(wireless_networks)

An evil twin attack is a hack attack in which a hacker sets up a fake Wi-Fi network that looks like a legitimate access point to steal victims’ sensitive details. Most often, the victims of such attacks are ordinary people like you and me.

The attack can be performed as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. The fake Wi-Fi access point is used to eavesdrop on users and steal their login credentials or other sensitive information. Because the hacker owns the equipment being used, the victim will have no idea that the hacker might be intercepting things like bank transactions.

An evil twin access point can also be used in a phishing scam. In this type of attack, victims will connect to the evil twin and will be lured to a phishing site. It will prompt them to enter their sensitive data, such as their login details. These, of course, will be sent straight to the hacker. Once the hacker gets them, they might simply disconnect the victim and show that the server is temporarily unavailable.

ADDITION: It may not seem obvious what happened. The problem is in the question statement. The attackers were not Alice and John, who were able to connect to the network without a password, but on the contrary, they were attacked and forced to connect to a fake network, and not to the real network belonging to Jane.

From CEH v13 Module 03: Scanning Networks, OS fingerprinting with Nmap (using the -O option) requires privileged access to craft raw packets (especially SYN, ACK, and ICMP). On Unix/Linux systems:

Root privileges are mandatory to perform TCP/IP stack fingerprinting.

If Nmap is run as a normal user, it fails to initiate OS scanning and exits with a message like “QUITTING!”.

So, in this case, the scan fails because the shell opened does not have elevated (root) privileges.

In CEH v13 Module 03: Scanning Networks, the behavior of firewalls in response to ACK scans is described in detail, especially regarding stateful vs. stateless firewalls.

An ACK scan (nmap -sA) is primarily used for firewall rule analysis. Here’s how it works:

When you send a TCP ACK segment:

If the port is closed and no firewall is present, the target should respond with a TCP RST packet.

If a stateless (non-stateful) firewall is used, it typically allows or blocks packets based only on rules about IP addresses, ports, and protocol type, without tracking session state.

If a stateful firewall is used, it keeps track of connection states. Therefore:

An unsolicited ACK packet (not part of any established session) will be silently dropped, because it doesn’t correspond to any active connection.

No RST is sent back because the firewall suppresses it, recognizing it as potentially malicious or out of context.

Therefore:

No RST response = packet was silently dropped.

Silent dropping of unsolicited ACK packets = Stateful Firewall Behavior.

Option Analysis:

A. There is no firewall in place

❌ Incorrect. If there were no firewall, an RST would be sent from the closed port.

B. This event does not tell you anything about the firewall

❌ Incorrect. The lack of a response is actually meaningful and implies stateful filtering behavior.

C. It is a stateful firewall

Correct. A stateful firewall inspects the packet, sees no valid session, and drops it silently.

D. It is a non-stateful firewall

❌ Incorrect. A non-stateful firewall would typically not inspect session state, and you'd still expect to see a response (likely an RST).

Reference from CEH v13 Study Guide and Courseware:

Module 03 – Scanning Networks, Section: Nmap Scanning Techniques → TCP ACK Scan

CEH Engage Labs – Network Scanning Phase: Firewall Rule Detection using ACK Scans

Footprinting techniques are used to collect basic information about the target IoT and OT platforms to exploit them. Information collected through footprinting techniques ncludes IP address, hostname, ISP, device location, banner of the target IoT device, FCC ID information, certification granted to the device, etc. pg. 5052 ECHv11 manual

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FCC_mark

An FCC ID is a unique identifier assigned to a device registered with the United States Federal Communications Commission. For legal sale of wireless deices in the US, manufacturers must:

· Have the device evaluated by an independent lab to ensure it conforms to FCC standards

· Provide documentation to the FCC of the lab results

· Provide User Manuals, Documentation, and Photos relating to the device

· Digitally or physically label the device with the unique identifier provided by the FCC (upon approved application)

The FCC gets its authourity from Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (47 CFR). FCC IDs are required for all wireless emitting devices sold in the USA. By searching an FCC ID, you can find details on the wireless operating frequency (including strength), photos of the device, user manuals for the device, and SAR reports on the wireless emissions

In CEH v13 Module 13: Hacking Web Applications, Server-Side Includes (SSI) is defined as a method for dynamically generating web content through directives embedded in HTML files.

stm File Extension:

Associated with Server Side Includes (SSI).

Files like .stm, .shtml, and .shtm can embed server-side directives.

Vulnerable if user input is improperly handled, allowing command injection or arbitrary file access.

Option Clarification:

A. .stm: Correct – indicates SSI is enabled.

B. .html: Static file, not associated with SSI.

C. .rss: XML feed; irrelevant to SSI.

D. .cms: Generic; doesn’t indicate SSI functionality.

In CEH v13 Module 09: Social Engineering, scareware is defined as a malicious tactic that uses fear, panic, or urgency to trick users into performing harmful actions such as downloading fake software or clicking malicious links.

Common Scareware Example:

A pop-up warns the user: “Your system is infected! Install this antivirus now!”

Victim downloads malware disguised as a solution.

Often used to deliver spyware, ransomware, or trojans.

Option Review:

A. Free cruise: Classic example of baiting, not scareware.

B. Account locked: Closer to phishing or credential harvesting.

C. Delivery delay: Another phishing variation.

D. Pop-up about infection: True scareware tactic.

Employing a tool like Sublist3r, which is designed to enumerate the subdomains of websites using OSINT, would be the most effective method to accomplish this goal. This option works as follows:

Sublist3r is a python tool designed to enumerate subdomains of websites using OSINT (Open Source Intelligence). It helps penetration testers and bug hunters collect and gather subdomains for the domain they are targeting. Sublist3r enumerates subdomains using many search engines such as Google, Yahoo, Bing, Baidu, and Ask. Sublist3r also enumerates subdomains using Netcraft, Virustotal, ThreatCrowd, DNSdumpster, and ReverseDNS. Subbrute was integrated with Sublist3r to increase the possibility of finding more subdomains using bruteforce with an improved wordlist1.

By using Sublist3r, the tester can quickly and efficiently discover the subdomains of the target organization’s website, which can provide valuable information about the network structure, the services offered, the potential vulnerabilities, and the attack surface. Sublist3r can also be used to perform passive reconnaissance, which does not send any packets to the target domain, and thus avoids detection by the target organization12.

The other options are not as effective as option A for the following reasons:

B. Analyzing Linkedin profiles to find employees of the target company and their job titles: This option is not relevant because it does not address the subdomain enumeration task, but the social engineering task. Linkedin is a social networking platform that allows users to create and share their professional profiles, which may include their name, job title, company, skills, education, and contacts. By analyzing Linkedin profiles, the tester may be able to find employees of the target company and their job titles, which can be useful for crafting phishing emails, impersonating employees, or exploiting human weaknesses. However, this option does not help to discover the subdomains of the target organization’s website, which is the goal of this scenario3.

C. Utilizing the Harvester tool to extract email addresses related to the target domain using a search engine like Google or Bing: This option is not sufficient because it does not provide a comprehensive list of subdomains, but only a partial list based on email addresses. The Harvester is a tool that can extract email addresses, subdomains, hosts, employee names, open ports, and banners from different public sources, such as search engines, PGP key servers, and SHODAN computer database. By using the Harvester, the tester may be able to extract some email addresses related to the target domain, which can reveal some subdomains, such as mail.target.com or support.target.com. However, this option does not guarantee to find all the subdomains of the target organization’s website, as some subdomains may not have any email addresses associated with them, or may not be indexed by the search engines4.

D. Using a people search service, such as Spokeo or Intelius, to gather information about the employees of the target organization: This option is not applicable because it does not address the subdomain enumeration task, but the personal information gathering task. Spokeo and Intelius are people search services that can provide various information about individuals, such as their name, address, phone number, email, social media, criminal records, and financial history. By using these services, the tester may be able to gather information about the employees of the target organization, which can be useful for performing background checks, identity theft, or blackmail. However, this option does not help to discover the subdomains of the target organization’s website, which is the goal of this scenario56.

In CEH v13 Module 07: Evading IDS, Firewalls, and Honeypots, various honeypot detection techniques are discussed. One such method is time-based TCP fingerprinting, which is effective against Honeyd-based honeypots.

Honeyd Honeypots:

Lightweight, low-interaction honeypots.

Often respond with inconsistent or delayed TCP timestamps.

Can be fingerprinted by comparing round-trip time and TTL values to real systems.

Option Clarification:

A. VMware detection: Uses CPU/BIOS identifiers and MAC address patterns.

B. Honeyd detection: Correct — uses time-based TCP fingerprinting.

C. Snort_inline: A network-based IPS, not the context here.

D. Sebek: Used to monitor user-level activity, not related to TCP response timing.

To perform a thorough password assessment, Bob can use:

Hardware Keyloggers: Installed between the keyboard and computer; captures keystrokes.

Software Keyloggers: Installed on the OS; logs keystrokes and system activity.

Network Sniffing: Captures plaintext passwords from unencrypted protocols (e.g., FTP, Telnet).

From CEH v13 Official Courseware:

Module 4: Enumeration

Module 6: Malware Threats

Module 8: Sniffing

CEH v13 Study Guide states:

“A comprehensive password audit can involve passive sniffing of credentials on the wire, software keyloggers for direct input capture, and hardware keyloggers for stealthy physical surveillance.”

Incorrect Options:

B, C, D: Limiting to just one method misses out on broader techniques.