Free ECCouncil 312-50v13 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 7

CEH v13 clarifies that nbtstat is used only for NetBIOS name table enumeration, not for listing shared resources. Tags such as < 20 > indicate file server services, but share enumeration requires tools like net view or SMB enumeration utilities.

Thus, the inability to list shares is due to tool limitation, not service configuration. Option C is correct.

The correct answer is B. NetBIOS Enumeration because the ports and services described map directly to NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NBT) and the actions align with querying NetBIOS name table and session services. In Windows networking (especially older systems), NetBIOS provides naming and session-layer services that can reveal valuable host and user information. Specifically, UDP 137 is used for the NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS), UDP 138 for NetBIOS Datagram Service, and TCP 139 for NetBIOS Session Service. Observing activity on UDP 137/138 and an open TCP 139 strongly indicates that NetBIOS services are reachable and can be interrogated.

The scenario states Jake “uses a utility to query the name table and session services,” which is a hallmark of NetBIOS enumeration. NetBIOS name table queries can disclose machine names, domain/workgroup names, and sometimes logged-in usernames (depending on configuration and what names are registered). Session/service enumeration can reveal information about active sessions and available resources. The fact that Jake obtains machine names, usernames, and shared folders without authentication is consistent with weakly configured legacy Windows networking where NetBIOS/SMB information disclosure is possible through null/unauthenticated queries.

Why not the other options: NFS enumeration targets UNIX/Linux file sharing and is unrelated to ports 137–139. SNMP enumeration uses UDP 161/162 and relies on SNMP communities, not NetBIOS naming/session queries. SMB enumeration is closely related and often overlaps operationally, but the question emphasizes “query the name table and session services” and explicitly references the classic NetBIOS port set (137/138/139), making NetBIOS enumeration the most precise classification for this behavior.

In practice, defenders mitigate this exposure by disabling NetBIOS where unnecessary, restricting these ports at network boundaries, enforcing SMB hardening, and limiting anonymous/null session information disclosure.

CEH v13 identifies encrypted communication channels as one of the most common and effective firewall evasion techniques. Firewalls that rely on packet inspection or signature-based filtering often cannot inspect encrypted payloads without SSL/TLS interception capabilities.

By encrypting malicious traffic—using HTTPS, VPN tunnels, or encrypted C2 channels—attackers can bypass firewall rules that inspect packet contents. CEH v13 emphasizes that this technique is widely used in malware communication, data exfiltration, and command-and-control operations.

IP spoofing (Option A) is limited by ingress and egress filtering and is less effective against modern firewalls. Open-source operating systems (Option B) do not inherently evade firewalls. Social engineering (Option D) targets users, not firewalls.

Therefore, Option C is the correct and CEH-aligned answer.

According to CEH v13 Cloud Computing, backup integrity and resilience are critical components of cloud security. The 3-2-1 backup model is a widely recommended best practice to mitigate unauthorized access, data corruption, and ransomware-related incidents.

The 3-2-1 rule dictates that organizations should maintain:

3 copies of critical data

Stored on 2 different media types

With 1 copy stored offsite or offline

This approach ensures that even if one backup is compromised, altered, or deleted—as described in the scenario—clean and trusted versions of the data remain available for restoration. CEH v13 emphasizes that offline or immutable backups significantly reduce the impact of malicious modification.

Option A focuses on physical security, which does not protect cloud backups. Option B addresses availability, not integrity. Option C is relevant to web application security, not backup protection.

CEH v13 explicitly highlights backup segregation and redundancy as key countermeasures against cloud data compromise. Therefore, Option D is the most direct and effective mitigation strategy.

The correct answer is WPA2. CEH wireless security material explains that WPA2 uses AES-based encryption together with CCMP, which provides confidentiality and message integrity protection. The scenario also mentions a structured four-message key negotiation process before protected traffic begins, which aligns with the well-known four-way handshake used in WPA and WPA2 environments. The deciding factor is the encryption and integrity combination: AES with CCMP is strongly associated with WPA2 in CEH guidance. WEP is far weaker and based on RC4, while WPA originally relied on TKIP as its hallmark improvement over WEP. WPA3 introduces newer protections and a different exam emphasis, but the classic CEH mapping for four-way handshake plus AES/CCMP is WPA2. CEH references also note that WPA2 was designed to improve enterprise-grade wireless security and that CCMP addresses integrity concerns more effectively than earlier approaches. Because the packet capture shows AES-based counter mode encryption with integrated integrity checks after the handshake sequence, the observed standard is best identified as WPA2.

CEH v13 highlights that encrypting session data in transit is one of the strongest defenses against session hijacking. IPsec VPN encrypts the entire IP packet, preventing attackers from capturing usable session tokens.

IPS helps detection but not prevention. Physical security and awareness do not address technical hijacking.

Therefore, Option A is correct.

The correct answer is A. Sending special characters to detect SQL modification behavior.

The scenario describes a black-box SQL injection discovery technique. The tester does not see the application source code or database query, so she submits SQL-significant characters and observes how the application responds. CEH-aligned SQL injection material explains that SQL injection involves injecting malicious SQL into existing queries and that vulnerability detection can involve injecting code into input fields and observing application responses or errors .

The important clue is that the application shows irregular behavior even without detailed error messages. That indicates the input may be modifying the backend SQL statement.

Option B is incorrect because truncation testing checks whether long or unexpected values are cut off, not whether SQL logic is affected.

Option C is too specific to identifier or database syntax handling and does not best match the general SQL injection probe described.

Option D is related, but it is narrower than the actual technique. The broader and more accurate black-box technique is sending special SQL-significant characters and observing behavior.

Therefore, the best answer is A. Sending special characters to detect SQL modification behavior.

CEH v13 identifies Slowloris as a low-bandwidth yet highly effective application-layer DoS technique that works by opening many HTTP connections and sending headers very slowly, never completing the request. Because the server must maintain these half-open HTTP sessions, its connection pool becomes saturated, preventing it from servicing legitimate users. Slowloris is particularly dangerous because it does not rely on malformed packets, high traffic volume, or protocol abuses; instead, it mimics legitimate HTTP behavior, making it difficult for firewalls or IDS systems to distinguish malicious traffic. This aligns exactly with the described scenario, where thousands of legitimate-looking HTTP connections are gradually consuming server resources. Fragmentation attacks (Option B) target packet reconstruction, UDP floods (Option C) generate high-bandwidth noise, and SYN floods (Option D) impact the TCP handshake layer, not the HTTP header behavior. Slowloris’ unique use of slow HTTP headers directly matches the symptoms described.

TCP 139 and UDP 137 and 138 correspond to NetBIOS over TCP/IP services that are closely associated with Windows file and printer sharing and legacy SMB browsing. In CEH methodology, these ports are high-value enumeration targets because NetBIOS name service and datagram service can disclose hostnames, domain or workgroup names, logged-in users, and shared resource details, often before any strong authentication occurs. UDP 137 is used for NetBIOS Name Service, which supports name registration and lookup. UDP 138 supports NetBIOS Datagram Service, commonly tied to browsing and announcement traffic. TCP 139 supports NetBIOS Session Service, historically used to establish sessions for SMB traffic and to query share and user-related information when configurations are weak.

In real environments, misconfigurations such as permissive share settings, legacy protocols, or anonymous and guest-access allowances can allow an attacker to enumerate user accounts, groups, and policies indirectly through browsing data, share lists, and RPC-related exposure that frequently accompanies SMB environments. CEH training emphasizes prioritizing enumeration against Windows networking services because the information gained can rapidly support follow-on attacks such as password spraying, targeted phishing, lateral movement, and privilege escalation planning.

The other choices include TCP 21 FTP, TCP 23 Telnet, and TCP 25 SMTP, which may expose banners or allow limited user enumeration in specific configurations, but they are not the primary ports associated with classic Windows user and group enumeration. UDP 133 is not a standard enumeration target in this context. Therefore, TCP 139 with UDP 137 and 138 is the best priority set for username and group-related enumeration.

Mobile Remote Access Trojans (RATs) are highlighted in CEH v13 Mobile Platform Hacking as one of the most dangerous threats. Once installed, a mobile RAT provides attackers persistent, covert access to devices, allowing screen capture, keystroke logging, microphone activation, and data exfiltration.

Unlike MitM or clickjacking, RATs operate post-compromise, often disguised as legitimate apps. Jailbreaking is detectable via integrity checks, but RATs can remain hidden even on non-rooted devices.

CEH v13 emphasizes that RATs bypass traditional defenses, including antivirus and MDM, making them extremely difficult to detect. Hence, Option C is correct.

CEH describes SQL injection testing as a core part of web application assessment. One of the first and safest validation techniques is using a tautology-based SQL injection payload, such as ' OR ' 1 ' = ' 1. If the application concatenates user input directly into SQL queries, such an input will cause the query to always evaluate as true, often returning additional records such as multiple user profiles. This confirms the presence of SQL injection without causing destructive effects like dropping tables. Testing XSS does not validate SQL injection, brute-forcing credentials is unrelated, and directory traversal attacks target file path manipulation rather than backend queries. CEH emphasizes avoiding destructive queries and starting with non-intrusive injection payloads that reveal improper input sanitization, making ' OR ' 1 ' = ' 1 the correct technique for confirming SQL injection vulnerabilities in URL parameters.

CEH v13 outlines insertion attacks as IDS evasion methods in which attackers send packets deliberately crafted so that the IDS processes them differently from the target host. In an insertion attack, malformed packets appear legitimate to the IDS—allowing malicious traffic to blend with benign inspection results—while the end host rejects or modifies the packets due to incorrect checksums, invalid flags, or protocol inconsistencies. As a result, the IDS sees one set of reconstructed data, while the actual host processes a different version or nothing at all. CEH emphasizes that intrusion detection systems may not follow full TCP/IP stack validation, making them susceptible to deception by malformed or borderline-conformant packets. Polymorphic shellcode (Option B) changes payload signatures, not packet structure. Session splicing (Option C) splits payload across packets to evade pattern matching but does not rely on checksum manipulation. Fragmentation attacks (Option D) divide traffic into smaller fragments, not alter validity fields. The described behavior fits insertion attacks precisely.

The correct answer is HTTP Server Core because the scenario describes the primary module of a web server that processes incoming requests and coordinates with additional modules responsible for encryption, URL rewriting, and authentication. In CEH-aligned web server architecture concepts, the core HTTP engine is responsible for handling client requests, managing connections, parsing HTTP headers, and passing requests to the appropriate modules for further processing.

Modern web servers such as Apache HTTP Server or Nginx operate using a modular architecture. The core component manages the fundamental HTTP protocol operations, while optional or loadable modules extend functionality. For example, SSL or TLS modules handle encryption, rewrite modules manage URL manipulation, and authentication modules enforce access controls. The description in the question clearly aligns with this architecture, where a central processing unit works in conjunction with supporting modules.

The other options do not fit. The Document Root refers only to the directory location from which web content is served. A Virtual Document Tree relates to how URLs are logically mapped to file paths. An Application Server is a separate server component that processes business logic, often interacting with backend systems, rather than directly managing HTTP request parsing at the core level.

Therefore, Jake is analyzing the HTTP Server Core, which is responsible for handling incoming requests and integrating modular security and performance features within the web server environment.

The most direct guideline is D. Register devices with a remote locate and wipe facility because the incident’s core impact came from two factors: loss of physical control of the device and continued exposure of sensitive records while the device remained active. A remote locate-and-wipe capability (commonly delivered through Mobile Device Management (MDM) / Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) platforms) addresses both problems immediately: it enables administrators to identify the device’s last known location (or trigger location reporting) and, critically, to remotely lock or wipe the device to prevent ongoing unauthorized access to patient data.

In healthcare environments handling regulated data, the priority during a lost-device event is rapid containment. Even if device tracking alone can help find the phone, it does not guarantee that sensitive information stops being accessed during the search. Remote wipe (often paired with remote lock, enforced encryption, and policy-based access control) reduces exposure time by allowing responders to remove protected data and invalidate application access. This is particularly important when the device is still connected to the network, because an attacker (or unauthorized holder) could continue using cached sessions, stored tokens, or locally available records until access is cut off.

Why the other options are less direct: A (anti-virus/DLP) may help detect malware or control data movement, but it does not solve the immediate lost-device containment requirement. B (VPN on public Wi-Fi) is unrelated because the problem is physical loss and inability to control the endpoint. C (install tracking software) helps locate the device, but the scenario highlights that sensitive records were exposed for hours; the most direct impact reduction is achieved when the organization can both locate and wipe/lock the device through an enrolled, centrally managed capability.

Therefore, enrolling devices in a remote locate and wipe facility would have most directly reduced the breach impact.

The symptoms point to a rogue DHCP scenario, which CEH materials commonly describe as a method attackers use to disrupt networks or perform man-in-the-middle attacks. If an unauthorized device begins answering DHCP requests faster than the legitimate DHCP server, endpoints may receive incorrect IP settings such as a fake default gateway or DNS server. This causes loss of connectivity to internal applications like a CRM system and can silently redirect traffic through an attacker-controlled host. The question explicitly mentions “irregular IP assignment attempts” tied to an unfamiliar device, which aligns strongly with rogue DHCP behavior rather than ARP-only manipulation or simple MAC-limit violations.

DHCP snooping is a Layer 2 security feature on Cisco switches that filters untrusted DHCP messages and allows only authorized DHCP servers on trusted ports. When enabled for the affected VLAN, the switch will drop DHCP offers and acknowledgments arriving on untrusted access ports, stopping the rogue device from leasing addresses. Option A, ip dhcp snooping vlan 10, is the command that applies DHCP snooping protection to the specific VLAN experiencing the issue, which matches the “subnet logs” and the localized impact described.

Option B, Dynamic ARP Inspection, primarily mitigates ARP spoofing and relies on DHCP snooping bindings, but it does not directly stop rogue DHCP leasing. Option D, port security, can limit MAC addresses but does not specifically block DHCP server behavior. Option C enables the feature globally but does not target the VLAN; the VLAN-specific activation in A best matches the scenario and the immediate restoration of correct addressing and connectivity.