Free HP HPE6-A78 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 4

The exhibit shows the configuration of a WLAN on an AOS-8 Mobility Controller (MC) with the following settings:

Key management: WPA3-Enterprise (indicating 802.1X authentication).

Use CNSA suite: Unchecked (using standard encryption, not the Commercial National Security Algorithm suite).

Key size: 128 bits (standard for AES-GCMP in WPA3).

Reauth interval: 1440 minutes (24 hours, the interval for re-authentication).

Machine authentication: Disabled (only user authentication is required).

Blacklisting: Disabled (clients are not blacklisted after failed attempts).

The question states that the AAA profile settings have not been adjusted, meaning the default roles (e.g., initial role, logon role, 802.1X default role) are not specified in the exhibit and are assumed to be the system defaults (e.g., "logon" for the initial and logon roles, and a default role like "guest" for the 802.1X default role). The question asks under which circumstances a client will receive the "default role assignment," which refers to the 802.1X default role configured in the AAA profile for the WLAN.

802.1X Authentication Process in AOS-8:

When a client connects to a WPA3-Enterprise WLAN, it starts in the initial role (typically "logon") to allow basic connectivity (e.g., DHCP, DNS).

During 802.1X authentication, the client is placed in the logon role to allow communication with the authentication server (e.g., ClearPass Policy Manager, CPPM).

If authentication succeeds, the client is assigned a role:

If the authentication server (e.g., CPPM) sends an Aruba-User-Role VSA with a role that exists on the MC, the client is assigned that role.

If no Aruba-User-Role VSA is sent, the client is assigned the 802.1X default role configured in the AAA profile for the WLAN.

If authentication fails or the server is unreachable, the client may be assigned a different role (e.g., a critical role, if configured) or denied access.

Option A, "The client has attempted 802.1X authentication, but the MC could not contact the authentication server," is incorrect. If the MC cannot contact the authentication server (e.g., due to a timeout), the client does not receive the 802.1X default role. Instead, the MC may apply a critical role (if configured) or deny access, depending on the configuration. The 802.1X default role is applied only after successful authentication.

Option B, "The client has passed 802.1X authentication, and the authentication server did not send an Aruba-User-Role VSA," is correct. If the client successfully authenticates via 802.1X and the authentication server (e.g., CPPM) does not send an Aruba-User-Role VSA, the MC assigns the client the 802.1X default role configured in the AAA profile for the WLAN. This is the "default role assignment" referred to in the question.

Option C, "The client has attempted 802.1X authentication, but failed to maintain a reliable connection, leading to a timeout error," is incorrect. A timeout error during authentication (e.g., the client fails to respond to EAP messages) typically results in an authentication failure, not a successful authentication. The client would not receive the 802.1X default role; it might be denied access or placed in a different role (e.g., a pre-authentication role).

Option D, "The client has passed 802.1X authentication, and the value in the Aruba-User-Role VSA matches a role on the MC," is incorrect. If the authentication server sends an Aruba-User-Role VSA with a role that exists on the MC, the client is assigned that specific role, not the 802.1X default role.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"After a client successfully authenticates via 802.1X, the Mobility Controller assigns a role to the client. If the authentication server (e.g., a RADIUS server) sends an Aruba-User-Role VSA with a role that exists on the controller, the client is assigned that role. If no Aruba-User-Role VSA is sent in the Access-Accept message, the client is assigned the 802.1X default role configured in the AAA profile for the WLAN. For example, if the AAA profile specifies ‘guest’ as the 802.1X default role, the client will be assigned the ‘guest’ role." (Page 305, Role Assignment Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:

"In WPA3-Enterprise with 802.1X authentication, the default role assignment occurs when a client successfully authenticates but the authentication server does not specify a role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. In this case, the client receives the 802.1X default role defined in the AAA profile, such as ‘guest’ or another role configured by the administrator." (Page 42, 802.1X Role Assignment Section)

Given the error message from the ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) Event Viewer, indicating a RADIUS authentication attempt from an unknown Network Access Device (NAD), you should check that the IP address the Mobility Controller (MC) is using to communicate with CPPM matches the IP address defined for the MC in the CPPM's device inventory. If there is a mismatch in IP addresses, CPPM will not recognize the MC as a known device and will not process the authentication request, leading to the error observed.

The AOS Security Dashboard in an AOS-8 solution (Mobility Controllers or Mobility Master) provides a client list through its Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system, showing the classification of clients and the APs they are connected to. The goal is to identify clients that belong to the company (Authorized clients) and have connected to devices that might belong to hackers (rogue or suspected rogue APs).

Client Classification:

Authorized: A client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and is part of the company’s network (e.g., an employee device).

Interfering: A client that is not authenticated to the company’s network and is considered external or potentially malicious.

AP Classification:

Authorized: An AP that is part of the company’s network and managed by the MC.

Suspected Rogue: An AP that is not authorized and is suspected of being malicious, often because it exhibits suspicious behavior (e.g., a BSSID close to an authorized AP, indicating potential spoofing).

Neighbor: An AP that is not part of the company’s network but is not connected to the wired network (e.g., a nearby AP from another organization).

Interfering: An AP that is not part of the company’s network and may be causing interference, but is not necessarily malicious.

The requirement is to find a client that is Authorized (belongs to the company) and connected to a Suspected Rogue AP (might belong to hackers).

Option A: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6d:a4; Client Classification: Authorized; AP Classification: Suspected RogueThis client is classified as "Authorized," meaning it belongs to the company, and it is connected to a "Suspected Rogue" AP, which might belong to hackers. This matches the requirement perfectly.

Option B: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6e:c5; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: NeighborThis client is "Interfering" (not a company client) and connected to a "Neighbor" AP, which is not considered a hacker’s device (it’s just a nearby AP).

Option C: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:6e:60; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: InterferingThis client is "Interfering" (not a company client) and connected to an "Interfering" AP, which is not necessarily a hacker’s device (it may just be causing interference).

Option D: MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:70:ab; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: Suspected RogueThis client is "Interfering" (not a company client), although it is connected to a "Suspected Rogue" AP. It does not meet the requirement of being a company client.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"The Security Dashboard’s client list in ArubaOS shows the classification of each client and the AP it is connected to. An ‘Authorized’ client is one that has successfully authenticated to an authorized AP and is part of the company’s network. A ‘Suspected Rogue’ AP is an unauthorized AP that exhibits suspicious behavior, such as a BSSID close to an authorized AP, indicating potential spoofing by a hacker. To identify security risks, look for authorized clients connected to suspected rogue APs, as this may indicate a company device has connected to a malicious AP." (Page 415, Security Dashboard Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:

"WIP classifies clients as ‘Authorized’ if they have authenticated to an authorized AP managed by the controller. A ‘Suspected Rogue’ AP is a potential threat, as it may be attempting to mimic a legitimate AP to lure clients. Identifying authorized clients connected to suspected rogue APs is critical for detecting potential attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attempts by hackers." (Page 78, WIP Classifications Section)

The task is to configure an AOS-CX switch to send logs to a SIEM Syslog server at IP address 10.4.13.15 using TCP port 514, with logs for events at the "warning" severity level or above (i.e., warning, error, critical, alert, emergency). The initial command entered is:

AOS-CX(config)# logging 10.4.13.15 tcp vrf default

This command configures the switch to send logs to the Syslog server at 10.4.13.15 using TCP (port 514 is the default for TCP Syslog unless specified otherwise) and the default VRF. However, this command alone does not specify the severity level of the logs to be sent, which is a requirement of the task.

Severity Level Configuration: AOS-CX switches allow you to specify the severity level for logs sent to a Syslog server. The severity levels, in increasing order of severity, are: debug, informational, notice, warning, error, critical, alert, and emergency. The requirement is to send logs at the "warning" level or above, meaning warning, error, critical, alert, and emergency logs should be sent, but debug, informational, and notice logs should not.

Option A, "Specify the ‘warning’ severity level for the logging server," is correct. To meet the requirement, you need to add the severity level to the logging configuration for the specific Syslog server. The command to do this is:

AOS-CX(config)# logging 10.4.13.15 severity warning

This command ensures that only logs with a severity of warning or higher are sent to the Syslog server at 10.4.13.15. Since the initial command already specified TCP and the default VRF, this additional command completes the configuration.

Option B, "Add logging categories at the global level," is incorrect. Logging categories (e.g., system, security, network) are used to filter logs based on the type of event, not the severity level. The requirement is about severity ("warning" or above), not specific categories, so this step is not necessary to meet the stated criteria.

Option C, "Ask for the Syslog password and configure it on the switch," is incorrect. Syslog servers typically do not require a password for receiving logs, and AOS-CX switches do not have a configuration option to specify a Syslog password. Authentication or encryption for Syslog (e.g., using TLS) is not mentioned in the requirements.

Option D, "Configure logging as a debug destination," is incorrect. Configuring a debug destination (e.g., using the debug command) is used to send debug-level logs to a destination (e.g., console, buffer, or Syslog), but the requirement is to send logs at the "warning" level or above, not debug-level logs. Additionally, the logging command already specifies the Syslog server as the destination.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 System Management Guide states:

"To configure a Syslog server on an AOS-CX switch, use the logging [tcp | udp] [vrf ] command to specify the server’s IP address, protocol, and VRF. To filter logs by severity, add the severity option to the logging command. For example, logging 10.4.13.15 tcp severity warning sends logs with a severity of warning or higher (warning, error, critical, alert, emergency) to the Syslog server at 10.4.13.15 using TCP. The default port for TCP Syslog is 514." (Page 89, Syslog Configuration Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"Severity levels for logging on AOS-CX switches are, in increasing order: debug, informational, notice, warning, error, critical, alert, emergency. Specifying a severity level of ‘warning’ ensures that only logs at that level or higher are sent to the configured destination." (Page 90, Logging Severity Levels Section)

To maintain a digital chain of custody in a network, a crucial practice is to ensure that all network infrastructure devices receive a valid clock using authenticated Network Time Protocol (NTP). Accurate and synchronized time stamps are essential for creating reliable and legally defensible logs. Authenticated NTP ensures that the time being set on devices is accurate and that the time source is verified, which is necessary for correlating logs from different devices and for forensic analysis.

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses endpoint classification (profiling) to identify and categorize devices on the network, enabling policy enforcement based on device type, OS, or other attributes. CPPM supports two primary profiling methods: passive and active classification.

Passive Classification: This method involves observing network traffic that endpoints send as part of their normal operation, without CPPM sending any requests to the device. Examples include DHCP fingerprinting (analyzing DHCP Option 55), HTTP User-Agent string analysis, and TCP fingerprinting (analyzing TTL and window size). Passive classification is non-intrusive and does not generate additional network traffic.

Active Classification: This method involves CPPM sending requests to the endpoint to gather information. Examples include SNMP scans (to query device details), WMI scans (for Windows devices), and SSH scans (to gather system information). Active classification is more intrusive and may require credentials or network access to the device.

Option A, "Passive classification refers exclusively to MAC OUI-based classification, while active classification refers to any other classification method," is incorrect. Passive classification includes more than just MAC OUI-based classification (e.g., DHCP fingerprinting, TCP fingerprinting). MAC OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier) analysis is one passive method, but not the only one. Active classification specifically involves sending requests, not just "any other method."

Option B, "Passive classification classifies endpoints based on entries in dictionaries, while active classification uses admin-defined rules to classify endpoints," is incorrect. Both passive and active classification use CPPM’s fingerprint database (not "dictionaries") to match device attributes. Admin-defined rules are used for policy enforcement, not classification, and apply to both methods.

Option C, "Passive classification is only suitable for profiling endpoints in small business environments, while enterprises should use active classification exclusively," is incorrect. Passive classification is widely used in enterprises because it is non-intrusive and scalable. Active classification is often used in conjunction with passive methods to gather more detailed information, but enterprises do not use it exclusively.

Option D, "Passive classification analyzes traffic that endpoints send as part of their normal functions; active classification involves sending requests to endpoints," is correct. This accurately describes the fundamental difference between the two methods: passive classification observes existing traffic, while active classification actively queries the device.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"Passive classification analyzes traffic that endpoints send as part of their normal functions, such as DHCP requests, HTTP traffic, or TCP packets, without ClearPass sending any requests to the device. Examples include DHCP fingerprinting and TCP fingerprinting. Active classification involves ClearPass sending requests to the endpoint to gather information, such as SNMP scans, WMI scans, or SSH scans, which may require credentials or network access." (Page 246, Passive vs. Active Profiling Section)

Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:

"Passive classification observes network traffic generated by endpoints during normal operation, such as DHCP or HTTP traffic, to identify devices without generating additional traffic. Active classification, in contrast, sends requests to endpoints (e.g., SNMP or WMI scans) to gather detailed information, which can be more intrusive but provides deeper insights." (Page 3, Profiling Methods Section)

For securing management access to the ArubaOS Web UI of an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC), it is a best practice to install a certificate signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). This ensures that communications between administrators and the MC are secured with trusted encryption, which greatly reduces the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. Using a CA-signed certificate enhances the trustworthiness of the connection over self-signed certificates, which do not offer the same level of assurance.

Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature designed for open wireless networks, where no password or authentication is required to connect. OWE enhances security by providing encryption for devices that support it, without requiring a pre-shared key (PSK) or 802.1X authentication.

Option C, "It allows anyone to connect, but provides better protection against eavesdropping than a traditional open network," is correct. In a traditional open network (no encryption), all traffic is sent in plaintext, making it vulnerable to eavesdropping. OWE allows anyone to connect (as it’s an open network), but it negotiates unique encryption keys for each client using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This ensures that client traffic is encrypted with AES (e.g., using AES-GCMP), protecting it from eavesdropping. OWE in transition mode also supports non-OWE devices, which connect without encryption, but OWE-capable devices benefit from the added security.

Option A, "It allows both WPA2-capable and WPA3-capable clients to authenticate to the same WPA-Personal WLAN," is incorrect. OWE is for open networks, not WPA-Personal (which uses a PSK). WPA2/WPA3 transition mode (not OWE) allows both WPA2 and WPA3 clients to connect to the same WPA-Personal WLAN.

Option B, "It offers more control over who can connect to the wireless network when compared with WPA2-Personal," is incorrect. OWE is an open network protocol, meaning it offers less control over who can connect compared to WPA2-Personal, which requires a PSK for access.

Option D, "It provides protection for wireless clients against both honeypot APs and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks," is incorrect. OWE provides encryption to prevent eavesdropping, but it does not protect against honeypot APs (rogue APs broadcasting the same SSID) or MITM attacks, as it lacks authentication mechanisms to verify the AP’s identity. Protection against such attacks requires 802.1X authentication (e.g., WPA3-Enterprise) or other security measures.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) is a WPA3 feature for open networks that allows anyone to connect without a password, but provides better protection against eavesdropping than a traditional open network. OWE uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to negotiate unique encryption keys for each client, ensuring that traffic is encrypted with AES-GCMP and protected from unauthorized interception." (Page 290, OWE Overview Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Wireless Security Guide notes:

"OWE enhances security for open WLANs by providing encryption without requiring authentication. It allows any device to connect, but OWE-capable devices benefit from encrypted traffic, offering better protection against eavesdropping compared to a traditional open network where all traffic is sent in plaintext." (Page 35, OWE Benefits Section)

Social engineering is a type of attack that relies on manipulating individuals into performing actions or divulging confidential information, often by exploiting human psychology rather than technical vulnerabilities. HPE Aruba Networking’s security documentation, particularly in the context of Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) and network security training, emphasizes the importance of recognizing social engineering as a common attack vector.

Option A, "An email is used to impersonate a bank and trick users into entering their bank login information on a fake website page," is a classic example of social engineering. This describes a phishing attack, where the attacker impersonates a trusted entity (a bank) to deceive users into providing sensitive information (login credentials) on a fraudulent website. Phishing is a well-documented form of social engineering that exploits trust and urgency to manipulate users.

Option B, "An attack exploits an operating system vulnerability and locks out users until they pay the ransom," describes a ransomware attack. This is a technical exploit that targets system vulnerabilities, not a social engineering attack, as it does not involve manipulating human behavior.

Option C, "A hacker eavesdrops on insecure communications, such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), and discovers login credentials," describes a man-in-the-middle (MITM) or eavesdropping attack. This is a technical attack that exploits insecure communication protocols, not social engineering.

Option D, "A user visits a website and downloads a file that contains a worm, which self-replicates throughout the network," describes a malware infection (specifically a worm). While the user’s action of downloading the file might involve some level of deception, this is not primarily a social engineering attack; it’s a malware delivery mechanism that relies on the user’s action but not necessarily on psychological manipulation.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"Social engineering attacks manipulate individuals into performing actions or divulging confidential information. A common example is phishing, where attackers send fraudulent emails that appear to come from a trusted source, such as a bank, to trick users into providing sensitive information like login credentials or financial details on a fake website." (Page 421, Security Threats Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:

"Phishing is a form of social engineering that uses deceptive emails, text messages, or other communications to trick users into revealing sensitive information or performing actions, such as clicking on malicious links or entering credentials on fraudulent websites." (Page 15, Social Engineering Section)

The scenario involves an AOS-CX switch configured for 802.1X port-access authentication. The configuration defines several roles and their associated VLANs:

port-access role role1 vlan access 11: Role1 assigns VLAN 11.

port-access role role2 vlan access 12: Role2 assigns VLAN 12.

port-access role role3 vlan access 13: Role3 assigns VLAN 13.

port-access role role4 vlan access 14: Role4 assigns VLAN 14.

The switch has 802.1X authentication enabled globally (aaa authentication port-access dot1x authenticator enable). Two ports are configured:

Interface 1/1/1:

vlan access 1: Default VLAN is 1.

aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1: If the RADIUS server is unavailable, assign role1 (VLAN 11).

aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2: Before authentication, assign role2 (VLAN 12).

aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3: After successful authentication, assign role3 (VLAN 13) unless overridden by a VSA.

Interface 1/1/2: Same configuration as 1/1/1.

Client1 on port 1/1/1:

Client1 authenticates successfully, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept with the VSA Aruba-User-Role: role4.

In AOS-CX, the auth-role (role3) is applied after successful authentication unless the RADIUS server specifies a different role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. Since CPPM sends Aruba-User-Role: role4, and role4 exists on the switch, Client1 is assigned role4 (VLAN 14), overriding the default auth-role (role3).

Client2 on port 1/1/2:

Client2 does not attempt to authenticate (i.e., does not send 802.1X credentials).

In AOS-CX, if a client does not attempt authentication and no other authentication method (e.g., MAC authentication) is configured, the client is placed in the preauth-role (role2, VLAN 12). This role is applied before authentication or when authentication is not attempted, allowing the client limited access (e.g., to perform authentication or access a captive portal).

Option A, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role2," is incorrect because Client1 should be assigned role4 (from the VSA), not role3.

Option B, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role1," is incorrect because Client2 should be assigned the preauth-role (role2), not the critical-role (role1), since the RADIUS server is reachable (Client1 authenticated successfully).

Option C, "Client1 = role4; Client2 = role2," is correct. Client1 gets role4 from the VSA, and Client2 gets the preauth-role (role2) since it does not attempt authentication.

Option D, "Client1 = role3; Client2 = role1," is incorrect for the same reasons as Option A and Option B.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"After successful 802.1X authentication, the AOS-CX switch assigns the client to the auth-role configured for the port (e.g., aaa authentication port-access auth-role role3). However, if the RADIUS server returns an Aruba-User-Role VSA (e.g., Aruba-User-Role: role4), and the specified role exists on the switch, the client is assigned that role instead of the auth-role. If a client does not attempt authentication and no other authentication method is configured, the client is assigned the preauth-role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access preauth-role role2), which provides limited access before authentication." (Page 132, 802.1X Authentication Section)

Additionally, the guide notes:

"The critical-role (e.g., aaa authentication port-access critical-role role1) is applied only when the RADIUS server is unavailable. The preauth-role is applied when a client connects but does not attempt 802.1X authentication." (Page 134, Port-Access Roles Section)