Free HP HPE6-A78 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 2

ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses various methods to classify endpoints, and one of them is TCP fingerprinting, which involves analyzing TCP/IP packets to identify the type of device or operating system sending them. To utilize TCP fingerprinting capabilities, network traffic needs to be accessible to the CPPM. This can be done by mirroring traffic to CPPM’s span port from a device that can see the traffic, like a core routing switch. This approach allows CPPM to observe the TCP characteristics of devices as they communicate over the network, enabling it to make more accurate decisions for device classification.

For an ArubaOS-CX switch enforcing 802.1X on a port without any fallback options or port-access roles configured, and where the supplicant on the connected client has not completed authentication, the only type of traffic the authenticator accepts from the client is EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol). EAP is a universal authentication framework used in 802.1X for message exchange during the authentication process. The switch allows EAP packets because they are necessary for the client and the authentication server to perform the authentication process. This is standard behavior for 802.1X authenticators, which is to permit EAP traffic to pass through even before authentication is successful to facilitate the authentication exchange. This information is supported by the IEEE 802.1X standard and ArubaOS-CX security configuration guides.

When configuring an ArubaOS-CX switch to send RADIUS debug messages to a central SIEM server, it is important to correctly direct these debug outputs. The command debug radius all activates debugging for all RADIUS processes, capturing detailed logs about RADIUS operations. If the SIEM server is already defined on the switch for logging purposes (as indicated by the command logging 10.5.6.12), the correct destination for these debug messages to be sent to the SIEM server would be through the syslog. This ensures that all generated logs are forwarded to the centralized server specified for logging, enabling consistent log management and analysis. Using syslog as the destination leverages the existing logging setup and integrates seamlessly with the network's centralized monitoring systems.

Setting up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) is particularly useful in scenarios where detailed analysis of network traffic is necessary to identify and address security concerns. Option B is the correct answer because it directly addresses the need to closely examine the traffic of a potentially malicious wireless endpoint. Packet capture on the MC allows the security team to collect and analyze traffic to/from specific endpoints in real-time, providing valuable insights into the nature of the traffic and potentially identifying harmful activities. This capability is essential for forensics and troubleshooting security incidents, enabling administrators to respond effectively to threats.

Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are both designed to disrupt the availability of a network, service, or device by overwhelming it with traffic or requests. HPE Aruba Networking documentation, particularly in the context of Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) and network security, often discusses these attacks to help administrators mitigate them.

DoS Attack: A DoS attack is launched from a single source (e.g., one device or IP address) and aims to overwhelm a target (e.g., a server, network, or device) with traffic, making it unavailable to legitimate users. For example, a DoS attack might flood a server with SYN packets to exhaust its resources.

DDoS Attack: A DDoS attack is a more sophisticated version of a DoS attack, where the attack is launched from multiple sources (e.g., a botnet of compromised devices). These sources work together to overwhelm the target, making the attack harder to mitigate because the traffic comes from many different IP addresses.

Option A, "A DDoS attack originates from external devices, while a DoS attack originates from internal devices," is incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks can originate from external or internal devices. The distinction is not about the location of the devices but the number of sources involved.

Option B, "A DoS attack targets one server; a DDoS attack targets all the clients that use a server," is incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks typically target a single entity (e.g., a server, network, or device) to disrupt its availability. They do not target "all the clients that use a server."

Option C, "A DDoS attack targets multiple devices, while a DoS is designed to incapacitate only one device," is incorrect. Both DoS and DDoS attacks usually target a single device or service to overwhelm it. The difference lies in the source of the attack, not the number of targets.

Option D, "A DDoS attack is launched from multiple devices, while a DoS attack is launched from a single device," is correct. This is the primary distinction between the two: a DDoS attack involves multiple sources (e.g., a botnet), while a DoS attack originates from a single source.

The HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide states:

"A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is launched from a single device to overwhelm a target, such as a server or network, making it unavailable to legitimate users. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, in contrast, is launched from multiple devices, often a botnet of compromised systems, to flood the target with traffic from many sources, making it harder to mitigate." (Page 20, DoS and DDoS Attacks Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

"The Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system can detect DoS and DDoS attacks. A DoS attack originates from a single source, while a DDoS attack involves multiple sources working together to overwhelm the target, such as a server or network infrastructure." (Page 423, WIP Threat Detection Section)

In managing ArubaOS-Switches, the best practice is to disable less secure protocols such as Telnet and use more secure alternatives like SSH (Secure Shell). SSH provides encrypted connections between network devices, which is critical for maintaining the security and integrity of network communications. This guideline is aligned with general security best practices that prioritize the use of protocols with strong, built-in encryption mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access and ensure data privacy.

Tunneling traffic between an Aruba switch and an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) allows for the centralized application of firewall policies and deep packet inspection to wired clients. By directing traffic through the MC, network administrators can implement a consistent set of security policies across both wired and wireless segments of the network, enhancing overall network security posture.

Device fingerprinting on an AOS-CX switch allows the switch to collect information about connected clients to aid in profiling and policy enforcement, often in conjunction with a solution like ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The commands provided create a device fingerprinting profile named "myprofile" and enable the collection of DHCP and LLDP information:

client device-fingerprint profile myprofile: Creates a fingerprinting profile.

dhcp: Enables the collection of DHCP information (e.g., DHCP options like Option 55 for fingerprinting).

lldp: Enables the collection of LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol) information (e.g., system name, description).

However, creating the profile and enabling DHCP and LLDP collection is not enough for the switch to start collecting this information from clients. The profile must be applied to the interfaces (ports) where clients are connected.

Option C, "Apply the policy to edge ports," is correct. In AOS-CX, the device fingerprinting profile must be applied to the edge ports (ports where clients connect) to enable the switch to collect DHCP and LLDP information from those clients. This is done using the command client device-fingerprint profile under the interface configuration. For example, on port 1/1/1, you would enter:

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Switch(config)# interface 1/1/1

Switch(config-if)# client device-fingerprint profile myprofile

This ensures that the switch collects DHCP and LLDP data from clients connected to the specified ports.

Option A, "Configure the switch as a DHCP relay," is incorrect. While a DHCP relay (using the ip helper-address command) is needed if the DHCP server is on a different subnet, it is not a requirement for the switch to collect DHCP information for fingerprinting. The switch can snoop DHCP traffic on the local VLAN without being a relay, as long as the profile is applied to the ports.

Option B, "Add at least one LLDP option to the policy," is incorrect. The lldp command in the fingerprinting profile already enables the collection of LLDP information. There is no need to specify individual LLDP options (e.g., system name, description) in the profile; the switch collects all available LLDP data by default.

Option D, "Add at least one DHCP option to the policy," is incorrect. The dhcp command in the fingerprinting profile already enables the collection of DHCP information, including options like Option 55 (Parameter Request List), which is commonly used for fingerprinting. There is no need to specify individual DHCP options in the profile.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"To enable device fingerprinting on an AOS-CX switch, create a device fingerprinting profile using the client device-fingerprint profile command, and specify the protocols to collect, such as dhcp for DHCP information and lldp for LLDP information. To start collecting data from clients, apply the profile to edge ports where clients connect using the command client device-fingerprint profile under the interface configuration. For example, interface 1/1/1 followed by client device-fingerprint profile myprofile enables fingerprinting on port 1/1/1." (Page 160, Device Fingerprinting Configuration Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 System Management Guide notes:

"The device fingerprinting profile must be applied to the ports where clients are connected to collect DHCP and LLDP information. The dhcp and lldp commands in the profile enable the collection of all relevant data for those protocols, such as DHCP Option 55 for fingerprinting, without requiring additional options to be specified." (Page 95, Device Fingerprinting Setup Section)

Based on the exhibits which seem to show RADIUS authentication and CoA logs, one can determine that CPPM (ClearPass Policy Manager) initially assigned the client to a role meant for non-profiled devices and then sent a CoA to the network access device (authenticator) once the device was categorized. This is a common workflow in network access control, where a device is first given limited access until it can be properly identified, after which appropriate access policies are applied.

The image indicates that there is an issue with the user role assignment, which is key to network access in ArubaOS. If the user role name sent by CPPM doesn't match any of the roles defined in the ArubaOS, then the user will be assigned a default or incorrect role that does not have the necessary permissions, thus leading to the connection errors and lack of Internet access. Ensuring that the role names are consistent between CPPM and ArubaOS can resolve this issue.