Free HP HPE6-A78 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 3

In the context of the ArubaOS Security Dashboard, if the goal is to find company clients that have connected to devices potentially operated by hackers, you would look for a client that is classified as 'Interfering' (indicating a security threat) while being connected to an 'AP Classification: Rogue'. A rogue AP is one that is not under the control of network administrators and is considered malicious or a security threat. Therefore, the client fitting this description is:

MAC address: d8:50:e6:f3:70:ab; Client Classification: Interfering; AP Classification: Rogue

In the context of ArubaOS Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIP), an authorized client is defined as a client that has successfully authenticated to an authorized Access Point (AP) and has passed encrypted traffic. This ensures that only clients which have been verified and authenticated according to the network's security policies are allowed to access network resources. Authentication typically involves credentials that are validated by a server, confirming the client's right to access the network securely.

In an AOS-8 mobility architecture, the Mobility Controller (MC) manages user roles and policies for wireless clients connecting to SSIDs. When a user connects to an SSID with WPA3-Enterprise security, the MC uses 802.1X authentication to validate the user against an authentication server, in this case, HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM). The SSID is configured with specific roles:

Initial role: Applied before authentication begins (not specified in the question, but typically used for pre-authentication access).

Logon role: Applied during the authentication process to allow access to authentication services (e.g., DNS, DHCP, or RADIUS traffic).

802.1X default role (guest): Applied if 802.1X authentication fails or if no specific role is assigned by the RADIUS server after successful authentication.

In this scenario, the user successfully authenticates, and CPPM sends an Access-Accept message with an Aruba-User-Role Vendor-Specific Attribute (VSA) set to "contractor." The "contractor" role exists on the MC, meaning it is a predefined role in the MC’s configuration.

When the MC receives the Aruba-User-Role VSA, it applies the specified role ("contractor") to the user session, overriding the default 802.1X role ("guest"). The MC does not combine the contractor role with other roles like logon or guest; it applies only the role specified by the RADIUS server (CPPM) in the Aruba-User-Role VSA. This is the standard behavior in AOS-8 for role assignment after successful authentication when a VSA specifies a role.

Option A, "Applies the rules in the logon role, then guest role, and the contractor role," is incorrect because the MC does not apply multiple roles in sequence. The logon role is used only during authentication, and the guest role (default 802.1X role) is overridden by the contractor role specified in the VSA.

Option C, "Applies the rules in the contractor role and the logon role," is incorrect because the logon role is no longer applied once authentication is complete; only the contractor role is applied.

Option D, "Applies the rules in the contractor role and guest role," is incorrect because the guest role (default 802.1X role) is not applied when a specific role is assigned via the Aruba-User-Role VSA.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:

"When a user authenticates successfully via 802.1X, the Mobility Controller applies the role specified in the Aruba-User-Role VSA returned by the RADIUS server in the Access-Accept message. If the role specified in the VSA exists on the controller, it is applied to the user session, overriding any default 802.1X role configured for the WLAN. The controller does not combine the VSA-specified role with other roles, such as the initial, logon, or default roles." (Page 305, Role Assignment Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide notes:

"ClearPass can send the Aruba-User-Role VSA in a RADIUS Access-Accept message to assign a specific role to the user on Aruba Mobility Controllers. The role specified in the VSA takes precedence over any default roles configured on the WLAN, ensuring that the user is placed in the intended role." (Page 289, RADIUS Enforcement Section)

The scenario involves an HPE Aruba Networking Instant AP (IAP) cluster with a WLAN configured for WPA3-Enterprise security, using HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) as the authentication server. CPPM is set to require EAP-TLS for authentication. A Windows 10 client attempts to connect but fails, and the CPPM Access Tracker shows an error: "Client does not support configured EAP methods," with the error code 9015 under the RADIUS protocol category.

EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol - Transport Layer Security) is a certificate-based authentication method that requires both the client (supplicant) and the server (CPPM) to present valid certificates during the authentication process. The error message indicates that the client does not support the EAP method configured on CPPM (EAP-TLS), meaning the client is either not configured to use EAP-TLS or lacks the necessary components to perform EAP-TLS authentication.

Option B, "Whether the client has a valid certificate installed on it to let it support EAP-TLS," is correct. EAP-TLS requires the client to have a valid client certificate issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) that CPPM trusts. If the Windows 10 client does not have a client certificate installed, or if the certificate is invalid (e.g., expired, not trusted by CPPM, or missing), the client cannot negotiate EAP-TLS, resulting in the error seen in CPPM. This is a common issue in EAP-TLS deployments, and checking the client’s certificate is a critical troubleshooting step.

Option A, "Whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the AAA Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster," is incorrect because the error indicates that CPPM received the authentication request and rejected it due to the client’s inability to support EAP-TLS. This suggests that the IAP cluster is correctly configured to use EAP-TLS (as the request reached CPPM with EAP-TLS as the method). The AAA profile on the IAP cluster is likely already set to use EAP-TLS, or the error would be different (e.g., a connectivity or configuration mismatch issue).

Option C, "Whether EAP-TLS is enabled in the SSID Profile settings for the WLAN on the IAP cluster," is incorrect for a similar reason. The SSID profile on the IAP cluster defines the security settings (e.g., WPA3-Enterprise), and the AAA profile specifies the EAP method. Since the authentication request reached CPPM with EAP-TLS, the IAP cluster is correctly configured to use EAP-TLS.

Option D, "Whether the client has a third-party 802.1X supplicant, as Windows 10 does not support EAP-TLS," is incorrect because Windows 10 natively supports EAP-TLS. The built-in Windows 10 802.1X supplicant (Windows WLAN AutoConfig service) supports EAP-TLS, provided a valid client certificate is installed. A third-party supplicant is not required.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"EAP-TLS requires both the client and the server to present a valid certificate during the authentication process. If the client does not have a valid certificate installed, or if the certificate is not trusted by ClearPass (e.g., the issuing CA is not in the ClearPass trust list), the authentication will fail with an error such as ‘Client does not support configured EAP methods’ (Error Code 9015). To resolve this, ensure that the client has a valid certificate installed and that the certificate’s issuing CA is trusted by ClearPass." (Page 295, EAP-TLS Troubleshooting Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Instant 8.11 User Guide notes:

"For WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS, the client must have a valid client certificate installed to authenticate successfully. If the client lacks a certificate or the certificate is invalid, the authentication will fail, and ClearPass will log an error indicating that the client does not support the configured EAP method." (Page 189, WPA3-Enterprise Configuration Section)

This question is identical to Question 17, with the same certificate properties and scenario. The client (Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com, and the server presents a certificate with:

Subject name: myhost.example.com

SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com

EKU: Server authentication

Issuer: MyCA_Signing (intermediate CA)

The intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing) is signed by MyCA (root CA).

The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.

The certificate validation process is the same as in Question 17:

Name Validation: The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which matches the server’s hostname, so this passes.

EKU Validation: The EKU is "Server authentication," which is correct for HTTPS, so this passes.

Chain of Trust Validation: The client attempts to build a chain from the server’s certificate to a trusted root CA:

Server certificate → MyCA_Signing → MyCA Since MyCA is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain cannot be validated, and the client does not trust the certificate.

Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The absence of MyCA in the client’s trust store prevents the client from validating the certificate chain.

Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect because the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which is valid.

Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect because the EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication."

Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid; the only issue is the missing trusted CA certificates.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"For a client to trust a server’s certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must include the server’s hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include ‘Server authentication’ for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:

"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the client’s trust store. For example, if a server’s certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)

HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses TCP fingerprinting as a passive profiling method to classify endpoints by analyzing TCP packet headers (e.g., TTL, window size) to identify the operating system (e.g., Windows, Linux). The company in this scenario has Mobility Controllers (MCs), campus APs, and AOS-CX switches, and wants to use CPPM’s TCP fingerprinting capabilities for endpoint classification.

TCP Fingerprinting: This method requires CPPM to receive TCP traffic from endpoints. Since CPPM is not typically inline with network traffic, the traffic must be mirrored to CPPM for analysis. This is often done using a SPAN (Switched Port Analyzer) port or mirror port on a switch or controller.

Option A, "You will need to mirror traffic to one of CPPM’s span ports from a device such as a core routing switch," is correct. For CPPM to perform TCP fingerprinting, it needs to see the TCP traffic from endpoints. This is typically achieved by mirroring traffic from a core routing switch (or another device like an MC) to a SPAN port on the CPPM server. For example, on an AOS-CX switch, you can configure a mirror session with the command mirror session 1 destination interface source vlan to send traffic to CPPM. This is a key consideration for enabling TCP fingerprinting.

Option B, "ClearPass admins will need to provide the credentials of an API admin account to configure on HPE Aruba Networking devices," is incorrect. TCP fingerprinting does not require API credentials. It is a passive profiling method that analyzes mirrored traffic, and no API interaction is needed between CPPM and Aruba devices for this purpose.

Option C, "AOS-CX switches do not offer the support necessary for CPPM to use TCP fingerprinting on wired endpoints," is incorrect. AOS-CX switches support mirroring traffic to CPPM (e.g., using a mirror session), which enables CPPM to perform TCP fingerprinting on wired endpoints. The switch does not need to perform the fingerprinting itself; it only needs to send the traffic to CPPM.

Option D, "TCP fingerprinting of wireless endpoints requires a third-party Mobility Device Management (MDM) solution," is incorrect. TCP fingerprinting is a built-in capability of CPPM and does not require an MDM solution. For wireless endpoints, the MC can mirror client traffic to CPPM (e.g., using a datapath mirror), allowing CPPM to perform TCP fingerprinting.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"TCP fingerprinting requires ClearPass to receive TCP traffic from endpoints for analysis. A key consideration is that you must mirror traffic to one of ClearPass’s SPAN ports from a device such as a core routing switch or Mobility Controller. For example, on an AOS-CX switch, configure a mirror session with mirror session 1 destination interface source vlan to send traffic to ClearPass for TCP fingerprinting." (Page 248, TCP Fingerprinting Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide notes:

"For ClearPass to perform TCP fingerprinting on wireless endpoints, the Mobility Controller can mirror client traffic to ClearPass using a datapath mirror. For wired endpoints, an AOS-CX switch can mirror traffic to ClearPass’s SPAN port, enabling TCP fingerprinting without requiring additional support on the switch itself." (Page 351, Device Profiling with CPPM Section)

In the context of an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) configuration, a client will receive the default role assignment if they have passed 802.1X authentication and the authentication server did not send an Aruba-User-Role Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA). The default role is assigned by the MC when a client successfully authenticates but the authentication server provides no specific role instruction. This behavior ensures that a client is not left without any role assignment, which could potentially lead to a lack of network access or access control. This default role assignment mechanism is part of Aruba's role-based access control, as documented in the ArubaOS user guide and best practices.

In an AOS-CX switch environment, 802.1X authentication is used to authenticate clients connecting to ports, and roles are assigned based on the authentication outcome and configuration. The roles mentioned in the question—fallback, auth, and critical—have specific purposes in the AOS-CX port-access configuration:

Auth role (roleB): This role is applied when a client successfully authenticates via 802.1X and no specific role is assigned by the RADIUS server (e.g., via an Aruba-User-Role VSA). It is the default role for successful authentication.

Fallback role (roleA): This role is applied when no authentication method is attempted (e.g., the client does not support 802.1X or MAC authentication and no other method is configured).

Critical role (roleC): This role is applied when the switch cannot contact the RADIUS server (e.g., during a server timeout or failure), allowing the client to have limited access in a "critical" state.

In this scenario, the client successfully authenticates via 802.1X, and CPPM does not send an Aruba-User-Role VSA. Since authentication is successful, the switch applies the auth role (roleB) as the default role for successful authentication when no specific role is provided by the RADIUS server.

Option A, "The client receives roleC," is incorrect because the critical role is only applied when the RADIUS server is unreachable, which is not the case here since authentication succeeded.

Option B, "The client is denied access," is incorrect because the client successfully authenticated, so access is granted with the appropriate role.

Option D, "The client receives roleA," is incorrect because the fallback role is applied only when no authentication is attempted, not when authentication succeeds.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"When a client successfully authenticates using 802.1X, the switch assigns the client to the auth role configured for the port, unless the RADIUS server specifies a different role via the Aruba-User-Role VSA. If no Aruba-User-Role VSA is present in the Access-Accept message, the auth role is applied." (Page 132, 802.1X Authentication Section)

Additionally, the guide clarifies the roles:

"Auth role: Applied after successful 802.1X or MAC authentication if no role is specified by the RADIUS server."

"Fallback role: Applied when no authentication method is attempted."

"Critical role: Applied when the RADIUS server is unavailable." (Page 134, Port-Access Roles Section)

An ArubaOS user role determines the firewall policies and bandwidth contracts that apply to the client’s traffic. When a user is authenticated, they are assigned a role, and this role has associated policies that govern network access rights, Quality of Service (QoS), Layer 2 forwarding, Layer 3 routing behaviors, and bandwidth contracts for users or devices.

Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) provides encrypted communications on open Wi-Fi networks, which addresses the company's desire to have encryption without requiring a password for guests. It can work in transition mode, which allows for the use of OWE by clients that support it, while still permitting legacy clients to connect without encryption. Combining this with a captive portal enables the desired welcome web page for guests to log in.