Free ECCouncil 312-49v11 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 3

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underData Acquisition,Digital Evidence, andImage/Evidence Examination, forensic investigators must be able to work with different disk image formats. TheE01 format(Expert Witness Format) is widely used in digital forensics because it supports compression, metadata storage, and integrity verification through hashing. However, many Linux-based forensic tools require the image to be mounted or accessed in araw (dd) formatfor direct analysis.

ewfmountis a Linux utility from thelibewftoolkit that allows investigators tomount E01 (and other EWF) images as raw disk images. Once mounted, the image appears as a raw device, enabling investigators to analyze partitions, file systems, and artifacts using standard forensic tools without altering the original evidence. This approach preserves forensic integrity and aligns with CHFI v11 best practices.

Autopsy (Option B) is a forensic analysis platform but does not perform E01-to-raw mounting itself. UFS Explorer (Option C) is a commercial forensic tool used for file system analysis, not image conversion. fdisk (Option D) is a disk partitioning utility and cannot mount or convert forensic image formats.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 emphasizes properforensic image handling, validation, and analysis on Linux systems, makingewfmountthe correct, forensically sound, and exam-aligned tool for converting and mounting E01 images

This scenario aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underAnti-Forensics TechniquesandDisk and File System Analysis. Attackers and sophisticated users may intentionally hide data in areas of a disk that are not addressed by the operating system, such asinter-partition gaps, slack space, or unallocated space. These techniques are commonly used as anti-forensic methods to conceal illicit data from standard file system views and basic forensic tools.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that such hidden data cannot be accessed through normal OS utilities, disk cleanup tools, or backups that rely on file system structures. Instead, forensic investigators must usedisk editor toolsor low-level forensic utilities that allow direct sector-by-sector examination of the storage media. Disk editors enable investigators to view raw hexadecimal data, inspect unallocated areas, analyze partition tables, and uncover hidden or deliberately concealed content stored outside recognized partitions.

Reformatting or cleaning the disk would destroy potential evidence and violate forensic principles, while full disk backups alone do not inherently reveal hidden inter-partition data without further low-level analysis. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 best practices for uncovering hidden data and countering anti-forensic techniques, using disk editor tools to examine the inter-partition gap is the correct and forensically sound approach.

According to theCHFI v11 Dark Web and Tor Browser Forensicsobjectives, the Tor network anonymizes user traffic by routing it through a series of relays:Entry (Guard) Relay → Middle Relay → Exit Relay. Each relay plays a distinct role in preserving anonymity, but only one relay is directly visible to the destination server.

TheExit Relayis the final node in the Tor circuit and is responsible for forwarding decrypted traffic from the Tor network to the target destination on the regular internet. As a result,destination servers see the IP address of the exit relay, not the original attacker. This makes exit relays highly visible and frequently misattributed as the source of malicious activity such as hacking attempts, scanning, spam, or data exfiltration.

CHFI v11 explicitly notes thatexit relays commonly face legal complaints, abuse reports, and law enforcement scrutiny, even though they do not originate the traffic. Investigators must understand this distinction to avoid false attribution during dark web investigations. Entry relays only see the client IP but not the destination, and middle relays see neither source nor destination. “Transfer relay” is not a valid Tor relay type.

From a forensic and legal perspective, recognizing the role of exit relays is critical when analyzing Tor-related incidents, as they represent thepoint of exposureto external networks.

Therefore, the Tor relay most likely to face legal scrutiny due to its visibility to destination servers—fully aligned with CHFI v11—is theExit Relay, makingOption Athe correct answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Computer Forensics Fundamentals and Investigation Process, one of the most critical steps in forming a specialized cybercrime investigation team isclearly assigning roles and responsibilities to team members. This step ensures that every aspect of the investigation is handled efficiently, lawfully, and without overlap or conflict.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that cybercrime investigations are multidisciplinary by nature and requirerole-based coordination. Typical roles include first responders, incident responders, forensic examiners, evidence handlers, photographers, documentation specialists, and legal advisors. Clearly defining these roles at the outset ensuresproper evidence handling, adherence to legal procedures, and effective incident response. It also supports maintaining thechain of custody, minimizing contamination of evidence, and ensuring accountability throughout the investigation lifecycle.

Whilelegal adviceandexternal supportare important, they are supplementary functions that support the investigation after the core team structure is established.Conducting digital forensics analysisis an operational activity that occurs later in the forensic process, not during team formation.

CHFI v11 explicitly highlightsbuilding the investigation teamandassigning responsibilitiesas foundational steps before evidence collection and analysis begin. Without clearly defined roles, investigations risk procedural errors, legal challenges, and inefficiencies.

Therefore, the most crucial step in forming a specialized cybercrime investigation team—fully aligned with CHFI v11 objectives—isassigning roles to team members, makingOption Dthe correct answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underMalware Forensics, specificallystatic vs. dynamic malware analysisand the use ofsandboxed environments. Dynamic malware analysis involves executing a suspicious file in a controlled and isolated environment to safely observe its real-time behavior. CHFI v11 emphasizes that many modern malware samples use obfuscation, packing, or fileless techniques that conceal their functionality unless they are actually executed.

The primary objective of running malware in a sandbox is tomonitor its behavior without endangering production systems. Investigators can observe network communications (such as command-and-control traffic), file system changes, registry modifications, process injection, persistence mechanisms, and encryption activity. These behaviors provide critical indicators of compromise (IoCs) and help investigators understand the malware’s capabilities, intent, and impact.

Sandboxing ensures forensic safety by isolating the malware from the host operating system and broader network, preventing unintended damage or data loss. The other options are not valid forensic objectives—performance optimization, author attribution, or storage efficiency are unrelated to dynamic malware execution. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 malware analysis methodology, the correct objective is to safely observe malware behavior and interactions in a controlled environment.

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underWeb Application ForensicsandLog Analysis, knowing the default storage locations of web server logs is essential for reconstructing web-based attacks. On Windows Server operating systems,Internet Information Services (IIS)stores its HTTP and HTTPS request logs by default in the directory:

%SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles

This directory contains subfolders such as W3SVC1, W3SVC2, etc., where each folder corresponds to a specific IIS website instance. The log files stored here record critical forensic details includingclient IP addresses, timestamps, HTTP methods, requested URLs, status codes, user agents, and referrers. These artifacts allow investigators to identify attack vectors such as SQL injection, command injection, directory traversal, brute-force attempts, and web shell uploads.

The other options are incorrect because they do not represent default IIS log locations. %AppData% is user-profile specific, %ProgramFiles% contains application binaries rather than logs, and %SystemRoot%\Logs\IIS is not a standard IIS logging path.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 explicitly coversIIS web server architecture and log analysis, emphasizing familiarity with default log paths to ensure timely evidence acquisition and accurate incident reconstruction. Therefore, %SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles is the correct and exam-aligned answer

This scenario aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underStandards and Best Practices Related to Computer Forensics, specifically theENFSI Best Practices for the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology. According to ENFSI guidelines, once evidence has been seized and secured, a structuredlaboratory assessmentmust be conducted before and during analysis. This phase focuses on evaluating exhibits, determining examination priorities, and maintaining detailed documentation of all items—whether analyzed immediately or deferred.

Maintaining records of both analyzed and non-analyzed exhibits is a key ENFSI requirement, as it ensures transparency, traceability, and accountability throughout the forensic process. CHFI v11 emphasizes that proper documentation allows investigators to track investigative progress, justify examination decisions, and demonstrate that no evidence was overlooked or mishandled. This practice also supports effective case management and preserves the integrity and admissibility of evidence in legal proceedings.

The other options describe different forensic phases: case evaluation occurs earlier at a strategic level, scene assessment applies to on-site evidence handling, and data acquisition refers specifically to extraction activities. In contrast, documenting and prioritizing exhibits in a controlled environment is a core function of thelaboratory assessment, making option C the correct ENFSI-aligned answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Network and Web Attacksdomain, the primary purpose of deploying and analyzinghoneypots, such asKippo, is toobserve, capture, and understand attacker behavior in a controlled environment. Honeypots are intentionally vulnerable systems designed to attract attackers so their actions can be studied without risking production assets.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that honeypot logs provide high-fidelity intelligence becauseany interaction with a honeypot is inherently suspicious. By analyzing these logs, investigators can identifyattack techniques, tools, malware payloads, command sequences, exploitation patterns, brute-force attempts, and post-compromise activities. This information is invaluable for understanding attackertactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)and for strengthening detection, prevention, and response strategies.

While honeypot data may indirectly reveal vulnerabilities or support security optimization, these aresecondary benefits. Honeypots are not primarily deployed for compliance reporting or performance monitoring of security controls. CHFI v11 clearly positions honeypot analysis as athreat intelligence and attacker profiling mechanism, enabling organizations to anticipate real-world attacks and improve defensive readiness.

Therefore, the paramount objective of analyzing honeypot logs—fully aligned with CHFI v11—isto identify, track, and understand attacker methodologies and strategies, makingOption Athe correct answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underProcedures and Methodology, specificallyevent correlation and analysis techniquesused to investigate complex incidents. Event correlation is essential for transforming large volumes of logs and alerts into meaningful incident narratives. CHFI v11 describes multiple correlation approaches, each suited to different investigative needs.

Thegraph-based approachmodels systems, applications, users, and network components asnodes, while relationships such as dependencies, communications, or trust relationships are represented asedges. By constructing such graphs, investigators can visualize how events propagate across interconnected systems, identify attack paths, and determine how a compromise in one component impacts others. This approach is particularly effective in analyzing lateral movement, dependency-based failures, and multi-stage attacks in enterprise environments.

Rule-based approaches rely on predefined conditions, codebook-based approaches match patterns against known attack templates, and neural network-based approaches focus on anomaly detection using machine learning. While these are valuable, only the graph-based approach explicitly represents system dependencies and relationships in a node–edge structure. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 event correlation methodologies, the correct answer isGraph-Based Approach.

This question maps directly to CHFI v11 objectives underMobile and IoT Forensics, specifically Android device acquisition and analysis procedures. In Android forensics, communication between the device and a forensic workstation running the Android SDK is primarily achieved using theAndroid Debug Bridge (ADB). ADB enables investigators to interact with the device’s file system, retrieve logs, execute commands, and collect forensic artifacts in a controlled manner.

To use ADB,USB Debugging mode must be enabledon the Android device. CHFI v11 explicitly highlights USB debugging as a critical prerequisite for logical acquisition, live data collection, and application-level analysis on Android devices. When enabled, it allows authenticated communication between the device and the forensic workstation without requiring intrusive methods that could alter evidence unnecessarily.

USB restriction mode limits data communication, recovery mode is used mainly for system repairs or flashing firmware, and “upgrade mode” is not a standard Android forensic feature. None of these allow normal SDK-based interaction for forensic analysis. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 Android forensic methodology, enablingUSB debugging modeis the correct and essential step to establish communication with the Android SDK workstation.