Free ECCouncil 312-49v11 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers

According to the CHFI v11 syllabus underOperating System ForensicsandLinux File System Analysis, understanding Linux file systems and their conversion methods is essential for both system administration and forensic investigations. TheEXT2file system is a non-journaling file system, whereasEXT3extends EXT2 by addingjournaling capabilities, which significantly improve system recovery and forensic traceability after crashes or improper shutdowns.

The correct command to convert an existing EXT2 file system into EXT3 is:

/sbin/tune2fs -j

This command enables journaling on the EXT2 file systemwithout reformatting or destroying existing data, making it a safe and efficient conversion method. CHFI v11 explicitly highlights this command as the standard approach for adding a journal to an EXT2 partition. Once journaling is enabled, the file system is recognized as EXT3.

The other options are incorrect and unrelated to Linux file system conversion. Options A and B involveNTFS Alternate Data Streams, which are Windows-specific. Option C is a disk-level command used for copying raw sectors, such as backing up or restoring an MBR, and does not modify file system journaling features.

The CHFI Exam Blueprint v4 emphasizes knowledge ofLinux file systems (EXT2, EXT3, EXT4)and administrative commands liketune2fs, as they are frequently referenced in forensic analysis and recovery scenarios, making Option D the correct and exam-aligned answer

In CHFI v11,memory dump analysisfocuses on identifyingvolatile artifacts, such as running processes, loaded modules, decrypted data, network connections, and application-specific memory remnants. The availability of Tor Browser artifacts in memory is highly dependent on theexecution and installation stateof the Tor Browser at the time of acquisition.

When theTor Browser is opened, it generates the highest number of artifacts in memory. These include active Tor processes, circuit information, encryption keys, temporary buffers, and cached session data. Even when theTor Browser is closed but still installed, some residual artifacts may remain in memory or be partially recoverable due to delayed memory reuse, along with indirect indicators such as prefetch references and previously allocated memory pages.

However, when theTor Browser is uninstalled, there are no active Tor-related processes or associated memory segments loaded into RAM. As explicitly covered in the CHFI v11 blueprint underTor Browser ForensicsandForensic Analysis: Tor Browser Uninstalled, uninstalling Tor significantly reduces both volatile and non-volatile artifacts. Consequently, memory dumps acquired after uninstallation contain theleast possible number of recoverable Tor artifacts, often limited to overwritten or non-attributable memory fragments.

Therefore, based strictly on CHFI v11 objectives and forensic principles,Tor browser uninstalled (Option B)is the correct answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Cloud Computing Threats and Attacksmodule, aWrapping Attack(also known as aSOAP wrapping attack) is a well-documented vulnerability that targetsSOAP-based web servicescommonly used in cloud environments. This attack exploits weaknesses in how XML signatures are validated within SOAP messages.

In a wrapping attack, the adversaryintercepts a legitimate SOAP message, duplicates or modifies themessage body, and then reinserts it into the SOAP envelope while preserving the original digital signature. Because some SOAP implementations validate only the signature and not the exact structure or position of the message body, the server mistakenly processes the attacker-controlled payload as if it originated from an authenticated user. This allows the attacker to execute unauthorized actions or malicious code within the cloud service.

CHFI v11 explicitly identifies wrapping attacks as a serious threat tocloud-based web services, especially those relying on SOAP and XML security mechanisms. The attack directly aligns with the scenario described: interception, duplication of the SOAP message body, impersonation of a legitimate user, and unauthorized access.

The other options are unrelated:Domain sniffinginvolves intercepting DNS traffic,cybersquattingtargets domain name registration abuse, anddomain hijackinginvolves taking control of a domain. None involve SOAP message manipulation.

Therefore, the cloud-based attack performed in this scenario—fully aligned with CHFI v11 documentation—is aWrapping attack, makingOption Dthe correct answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Computer Forensics FundamentalsandFile Analysismodules, identifying file types usingfile signatures (magic numbers)is a core forensic technique. File extensions can be easily manipulated by attackers as an anti-forensics tactic, so investigators rely onhexadecimal headersto determine the true file format.

The hexadecimal sequence47 49 46corresponds to the ASCII characters“GIF”. This signature appears at the beginning of allGraphics Interchange Format (GIF)files and is typically followed by version identifiers such asGIF87aorGIF89a. CHFI v11 explicitly lists GIF file headers as a common example when teaching file signature verification using hex editors.

For comparison:

PNGfiles start with the signature 89 50 4E 47

BMPfiles start with 42 4D (ASCII “BM”)

JPEGfiles typically start with FF D8 FF

Because the investigator observes 47 49 46 at the beginning of the file, this conclusively identifies the file as aGIF image, regardless of its filename or extension.

CHFI v11 emphasizes thathexadecimal signature analysisis essential when investigating disguised files, malware hidden as images, or data exfiltration attempts using file extension mismatch techniques.

Therefore, based on the file’s hexadecimal signature, the image format isGIF, makingOption Cthe correct answer.

According to theCHFI v11 Regulations, Policies, and Ethicsdomain,privacy issues most commonly arise during the forensic analysis phaseof a cybercrime investigation. While search warrants legally authorize investigators to collect and examine specific digital evidence, they are typicallyscope-limitedto the suspect, systems, data types, and timeframes defined in the warrant.

Duringforensic analysis, investigators may inadvertently encounterpersonal or sensitive information belonging to third parties, such as usernames, email addresses, chat records, credentials, or identifiers of other users connected to the system. CHFI v11 explicitly highlights this phase as legally and ethically sensitive because analysts must ensure thatnon-relevant data and third-party information are handled carefullyto avoid violations of privacy laws and data protection regulations.

Implementing network security measures is a preventive activity, not an investigative one. Obtaining search warrants is a legal safeguard designed to protect privacy, not create privacy concerns. Preserving anonymity is a mitigation action, not the step that introduces the risk.

CHFI v11 stresses the importance ofminimization, access control, proper documentation, and legal oversightduring forensic analysis to prevent misuse or overexposure of unrelated personal data. Failure to manage privacy during this phase can result in legal challenges, evidence exclusion, or regulatory violations.

Therefore, the step that raisesprivacy-related concernsin this scenario isconducting forensic analysis, makingOption Bthe correct and CHFI v11–verified answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underMalware ForensicsandStatic Malware Analysis of Suspicious Documents. When analyzing potentially malicious Microsoft Office documents, CHFI v11 emphasizes that investigators shouldalways begin with static analysisbefore attempting any form of execution. This approach minimizes risk and helps identify embedded threats such as VBA macros, OLE objects, exploits, and obfuscation techniques without activating the payload.

Theoleidtool (part of the oletools suite) is specifically designed for theinitial inspection of OLE-based Microsoft Office documents. It quickly identifies indicators of compromise such as the presence of macros, embedded objects, suspicious file formats, encryption, and known exploit characteristics. CHFI v11 highlights oleid as a safe, non-intrusive first step to triage Office documents and determine whether deeper analysis (e.g., macro extraction or sandbox execution) is warranted.

Opening the document in a sandbox is adynamic analysis stepand should only occur after static indicators confirm malicious intent. The other options are either non-standard or insufficient for detecting embedded macro-based malware. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 malware forensics methodology, executingoleidto review suspicious components is the correct initial step.

Within the CHFI v11 syllabus underNetwork ForensicsandLog Analysis, understandingCisco router log mnemonicsis essential for investigating network-based attacks and policy violations. Cisco devices generate structured log messages that include afacility,severity level, andmnemonic, which together describe the event detected by the device.

The mnemonic%SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGPspecifically indicates that apacket (TCP or UDP)matched anIP Access Control List (ACL)rule and was logged accordingly. The “SEC” facility denotes a security-related event, the severity level “6” represents an informational message, and “IPACCESSLOGP” confirms that the log entry was generated due to an ACL permit or deny rule matching a packet. This type of log is commonly used in forensic investigations to trace suspicious traffic, identify unauthorized access attempts, and correlate firewall or router behavior with other network logs.

Option B (IPACCESSLOGRL) refers to rate-limited ACL logging, not standard packet logging. Option A is specific to IPv6 ACL logging and does not apply unless IPv6 traffic is explicitly involved. Option D (TOOMANY) relates to excessive event conditions and is not tied to ACL packet matching.

The CHFI v11 Exam Blueprint highlightsanalyzing Cisco router and firewall logs, including ACL-based messages, as a key skill for detecting network attacks and reconstructing intrusion timelines. Therefore,%SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGPis the correct and exam-aligned answer

According to the CHFI v11 objectives underMalware ForensicsandStatic Malware Analysis, the correct initial step when analyzing a suspicious document—such as a potentially malicious PDF—is to performstatic analysis before any execution. Running the toolPDFiDusing the command python pdfid.py infected.pdf is a standard and CHFI-aligned first action. PDFiD is designed to quickly scan a PDF file and identify suspicious elements such as /JavaScript, /OpenAction, /Launch, /EmbeddedFile, and /AA, which are commonly abused by attackers to deliver malware through PDF documents.

This approach is non-intrusive and ensures the investigator does not accidentally trigger malicious code, thereby preserving evidence integrity and maintaining forensic soundness. Opening the file in a virtual machine (Option B) constitutesdynamic analysis, which should only be performed after initial static indicators suggest malicious intent and after proper containment controls are in place. Metadata extraction (Option C) is useful but limited, as metadata alone does not reliably expose embedded exploit code. Manual hex inspection (Option D) is advanced and time-consuming and is not recommended as the first step.

The CHFI v11 Exam Blueprint emphasizes astructured malware analysis workflow, starting with static analysis tools like PDFiD for suspicious documents, making Option A the most appropriate and exam-accurate answer

This question directly aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underRegulations, Policies, and Ethics, particularly laws that influence forensic investigations and corporate compliance. The law described is theSarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), enacted in2002in response to major corporate accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. CHFI v11 highlights SOX as a critical regulation governing publicly traded companies in the United States.

SOX mandates strict requirements forcorporate financial reporting, internal control assessments, executive accountability, audit independence, and record retention. Sections such asSOX Section 302require executives to personally certify the accuracy of financial statements, whileSection 404enforces internal control audits to prevent fraud. These requirements are highly relevant in forensic investigations involving financial misconduct, as investigators often rely on audit logs, financial records, and compliance documentation governed by SOX.

The other options are incorrect: PCI DSS applies to payment card data security, GLBA governs customer financial data privacy, and ECPA addresses electronic communications privacy. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 legal frameworks and compliance objectives, the correct law Scarlett is reviewing isSOX (Sarbanes–Oxley Act).

According to theCHFI v11 Mobile and IoT Forensicsobjectives, iOS devices maintain geolocation-related artifacts through thelocation services subsystem (locationd). One of the key forensic artifacts associated with this subsystem isClients.plist.

TheClients.plistfile stores information aboutapplications and system services that have requested or used location services. It contains identifiers for apps, service names, permission states, and timestamps indicating when location data was accessed. This makes it highly valuable for investigators attempting to determinewhich apps accessed location data and when, which is crucial in cases involving surveillance, stalking, fraud, or physical movement reconstruction.

The other files listed do not store geolocation data.Cookies.plistcontains browser cookie information,Sms.dbstores SMS and iMessage content, andDraftMessage.plistholds unsent message drafts. None of these files are related to GPS or location services.

CHFI v11 emphasizes correlatingClients.plistwith other artifacts such as location caches, application logs, and timestamps to reconstruct user movement and application behavior on iOS devices.

Therefore, the file that contains geolocation data of applications and system services on iOS devices—fully aligned with CHFI v11—isClients.plist, makingOption Dthe correct answer.