Free ECCouncil 312-39 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers

Capturing and comparing system snapshots before and after suspected compromise is a core method of host integrity monitoring. The goal is to detect unauthorized changes to critical system components such as registry keys, scheduled tasks, services, binaries, configuration files, and security settings. By comparing a known-good baseline snapshot to a suspected-compromised state, analysts can identify what changed, when it changed (with supporting timestamps), and which changes are anomalous relative to expected patching or administrative activity. While this activity can occur within a broader digital forensics investigation, the specific technique described—baseline comparison to detect unauthorized modification—is integrity monitoring. Signature-based detection focuses on matching known indicators (hashes, strings, known patterns) and does not rely on before/after snapshot comparison. Threat intelligence gathering is about collecting and analyzing information on external threats, not directly comparing host states. From a SOC standpoint, integrity monitoring supports rapid scoping and eradication because it highlights persistence and tampering mechanisms that must be removed and can reveal stealth modifications that evade signature scanners. It also supports compliance requirements by demonstrating configuration control and unauthorized-change detection capabilities.

A proxy server acts as an intermediary between users and the internet, routing HTTP/HTTPS requests through a controlled inspection point. This provides visibility (who accessed what, when, from which device) and enables enforcement (block categories, block malicious destinations, inspect headers, apply SSL/TLS inspection where permitted, and enforce acceptable-use policies). While web content filtering is often a feature implemented through proxies or secure web gateways, the question explicitly describes an “intermediary for all HTTP and HTTPS requests,” which is the defining characteristic of a proxy. Whitelisting and blacklisting are policy methods (allow/deny lists) that can be applied within a proxy or firewall, but they are not the architectural containment method described. From a SOC containment standpoint, proxying enables rapid response actions: block newly observed malicious domains/URLs, monitor for beaconing, and prevent users from reaching phishing infrastructure. It also supports investigations by providing centralized web activity logs for correlation with endpoint and identity telemetry. Therefore, the correct option is proxy servers.

The described activities—acquiring RAM dumps, extracting event logs, and collecting PCAPs—are evidence gathering and forensic analysis. This phase focuses on preserving and analyzing artifacts to understand what happened, how it happened, and what the scope is. RAM capture can reveal in-memory indicators such as encryption keys, injected code, running processes, network connections, and credential material that may not be present on disk. Windows Event Logs provide timelines for process creation, logons, privilege changes, and service activity. PCAP data supports validation of lateral movement, C2 communication, and exfiltration paths. Containment has already occurred in the scenario (infected endpoints were isolated), and eradication would involve removing ransomware, closing persistence, patching exploited paths, and ensuring the threat cannot return. Recovery is restoring systems and data to normal operations. In SOC practice, evidence collection should occur as early as safely possible (often immediately after containment) to avoid losing volatile artifacts, which is why the forensic team is acting now. Therefore, the current phase is evidence gathering and forensic analysis.

Once the event sources are validated, the next logical step is to define the detection logic—correlation rules and conditions that represent privilege escalation patterns. In SOC engineering, validated sources mean you have the raw ingredients; now you must specify what “bad” looks like in those logs. For privilege escalation on Windows, this might include abnormal group membership changes, creation of new privileged accounts, suspicious privilege assignment events, UAC bypass indicators, or admin logons from non-admin workstations. Defining correlation rules also includes setting time windows, selecting strong pivots (account, host, SID), and incorporating context to reduce noise (approved admin accounts, maintenance windows, known tooling). Defining response actions is important, but it should follow detection logic so you don’t automate reactions to unstable or noisy detections. Testing immediately in production is risky; best practice is to test in a controlled manner or pilot mode first to avoid operational disruption and excessive false positives. Collecting historical logs can help tune baselines, but the scenario states sources are already validated; the next step is to codify the conditions that detect the targeted behavior.

 In a push-based log collection mechanism, the system or application actively sends (or “pushes”) log records to a designatedstorage location, which can be either on the local disk or over a network to a remote server. This is in contrast to a pull-based mechanism, where the log records are retrieved (or “pulled”) by the management server from the devices.

The push-based mechanism is often used for real-time monitoring and alerting because it allows for immediate transfer of log data as events occur. This method ensures that log records are consistently and reliably sent to a central repository without the need for a third-party service to request or retrieve them.

Directory Traversal is the technique most directly aligned with “manipulating URL paths to access files and directories outside the web root.” Attackers abuse path sequences (for example, patterns like “../”) or encoded variants to move upward in a directory structure and reach restricted locations such as configuration files, credentials, or system files. In SOC investigations, repeated attempts to request “outside-root” paths in web logs (often with URL encoding, double encoding, or mixed separators) is a classic indicator of traversal probing and exploitation. This differs from SQL injection, which targets database queries and typically shows payloads manipulating SQL syntax (quotes, UNION, tautologies, time delays) rather than filesystem path navigation. XSS focuses on injecting scripts into web pages to run in a victim’s browser, so the log artifacts are more about injected JavaScript/HTML payloads and reflected/stored contexts. Cookie poisoning is a session attack involving tampering with session tokens or cookie values, which shows up as abnormal cookie parameters rather than path traversal requests. Given the explicit evidence of path manipulation to reach unauthorized directories, Directory Traversal is the best match and should drive mitigations such as strict input validation, canonical path checks, least-privilege file permissions, and WAF rules.

These activities fall under Preparation because they are about building readiness before incidents occur. Preparation includes developing and documenting playbooks, establishing tooling and infrastructure (SOC facility, monitoring platforms), training staff, defining roles and escalation paths, and exercising procedures through tabletop simulations. The goal is to ensure that when incidents happen, the SOC and incident response teams can respond quickly, consistently, and effectively. Recovery occurs after an incident to restore systems. Incident recording and assignment is the operational step of logging and routing a specific incident. Incident triage is the rapid assessment of a specific alert to determine severity and next actions. None of those are the focus here; the scenario is clearly about capability building and readiness. From a SOC maturity perspective, strong preparation reduces response time, minimizes confusion during high-stress events, improves coordination across teams, and enhances compliance posture by demonstrating that the organization has defined and tested incident handling procedures.

The pattern described most strongly indicates lateral movement: multiple network logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) across multiple machines in a short period, combined with NetBIOS/SMB-related service activity, suggests a host-to-host authentication pattern consistent with an attacker moving through the environment. In SOC terms, Logon Type 3 reflects network-based authentication (commonly SMB, remote service access, admin shares, or remote management). When the same source account or host triggers many network logons quickly across endpoints—especially outside normal administrative patterns—it often indicates credential abuse (pass-the-hash, stolen credentials, or remote execution frameworks). While SMB-worm propagation is possible, the scenario emphasizes authentication events across multiple machines rather than explicit malware indicators or file-write propagation patterns. Routine maintenance is plausible only with strong supporting context (approved admin accounts, change windows, known tooling), which is not provided. A single user connecting to shared files typically wouldn’t generate a burst of network logons “for multiple machines” in the same way, nor would it usually coincide with suspicious NetBIOS helper state changes as an anomaly. Therefore, the best classification is attacker lateral movement within the network.

A Hybrid Attack is a type of cyber attack that combines elements of a dictionary attack with a brute force attack. It involves taking words from a dictionary (which could be a list of common passwords or related words) and augmenting them with numbers and symbols to generate potential passwords. This method increases the chances of cracking a password by including the common variations that users often add to their passwords to meet complexity requirements.

The Security Log Event ID 4624 in Windows 10 indicates that an account was successfully logged on. This event is generated when a logon session is created, which could be due to a user logging on to the system, a service starting, or a scheduled task running. It is a critical event for security monitoring as it can help in identifying unauthorized access to the system.

References This information is consistent with the official Microsoft documentation and security guidelines, which can be found in the EC-Council’s Certified SOCAnalyst (CSA) course materials and study guides, specifically in the sections discussing the auditing and monitoring of security log events.