Free ECCouncil 212-89 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 9

In this scenario, the inability to access the file server via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), despite the server being pingable and other services functioning normally, suggests a service-specific disruption rather than a complete system shutdown or broader network issue. This pattern is indicative of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack targeted at the file server's RDP service or network congestion that specifically affects RDP connectivity. A DoS attack aims to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the Internet. The fact that other services (like email) are operational rules out broader system or admin account issues, pointing towards a specific problem with accessing the file server, most likely due to a denial-of-service condition.

The scenario described fits the characteristics of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack. APTs are sophisticated, stealthy, and continuous computer hacking processes often orchestrated by groups targeting a specific entity. These attackers penetrate the network through vulnerabilities, maintain access without detection, and achieve their objectives, such as data exfiltration or financial theft, over an extended period. The fact that attackers exploited a minor vulnerability, maintained access for six months, and performed lateral movements to access critical systems for fraudulent transactions highlights the strategic planning and persistence typical of APT attacks.

The GPG18 and Forensic readiness planning (SPF) principles outline various guidelines to enhance an organization's readiness for forensic investigation and response. Principle 5, which suggests that organizations should adopt a scenario-based Forensic Readiness Planning approach that learns from experience gained within the business, emphasizes the importance of being prepared for a wide range of potential incidents by leveraging lessons learned from past experiences. This approach helps in continuously improving forensic readiness and response capabilities by adapting to the evolving threat landscape and organizational changes.

The correct sequence of steps involved in forensic readiness planning, based on the activities described, is as follows:

Identify the potential evidence required for an incident.

Determine the source of the evidence.

Define a policy that determines the pathway to legally extract electronic evidence with minimal disruption.

Establish a policy for securely handling and storing the collected evidence.

Identify if the incident requires full or formal investigation.

Train the staff to handle the incident and preserve the evidence.

Create a special process for documenting the procedure.

In the ECIH Incident Handling lifecycle, once a breach is detected, the IH&R team must focus on analysis and scoping to understand how the attack occurred, what systems were affected, and whether the attacker still has access.

Option D is correct because analyzing logs with Incident Response Automation and Orchestration (IRAO) tools allows rapid correlation of events, identification of attacker entry points, and determination of breach scope. ECIH stresses that zero-day incidents require deep forensic and timeline analysis to ensure complete containment and prevent recurrence.

Options A and C are important but depend on accurate breach understanding. Option B is premature without full incident context.

Therefore, log analysis and origin tracing is the correct primary focus.

The scenario described, where Oscar receives an email with a link that contains a malicious URL redirecting to evilsite.org, exemplifies a vulnerability related to unvalidated redirects and forwards. This type of vulnerability occurs when a web application accepts untrusted input that could cause the web application to redirect the request to a URL contained within untrusted input. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious URL that leads unsuspecting users to phishing sites or other malicious websites, under the guise of a legitimate domain. This is distinct from malware, which refers to malicious software; SQL injection, which involves inserting malicious SQL queries through input fields to manipulate or exploit databases; and is not a term related to cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

In the context of US Federal Agencies, incidents are categorized based on their impact on operations, assets, or individuals. A DoS attack that prevents or impairs the authorized functionality of networks and is still ongoing without successful mitigation efforts typically falls under Category 2 (CAT 2). This category is designated for incidents that have a significant impact, requiring immediate reporting and response. The reporting timeframe of within 2 hours as mentioned aligns with the urgency associated with CAT 2 incidents, emphasizing the need for swift action to address the attack and restore normal operations.

The Delmont organization faced an espionage incident, which involves the unauthorized access and theft of proprietary or confidential information for passing it onto competitors or other external entities. Espionage is targeted at obtaining secrets or intellectual property to gain a competitive advantage or for other strategic purposes. Unlike network and resource abuses or email-based abuse, which might not specifically target sensitive information, espionage directly aims at stealing valuable data. Unauthorized access is a method that could be used in an espionage attempt but does not fully capture the motive of passing stolen information to competitors.

This scenario demonstrates a preventive containment action during an email security incident. The ECIH Email Security Incident Handling module emphasizes that once phishing is identified, responders should immediately prevent further delivery to reduce organizational exposure.

Option A is correct because Lena removes malicious emails from the mail server’s delivery queue before users receive them. This action directly reduces risk by preventing additional users from clicking malicious links or submitting credentials. ECIH identifies email purging as a critical containment technique during active phishing campaigns.

Option B is an investigative action, not containment. Option C applies after delivery and compromise. Option D addresses already compromised accounts rather than preventing exposure.

By stopping malicious emails before delivery, Lena aligns with ECIH best practices for rapid containment of email-based threats.

In Wireshark, the filtericmp.type==8is used to detect ping sweep attempts. ICMP type 8 messages are echo requests, which are used in ping operations to check the availability of a network device. A ping sweep involves sending ICMP echo requests to multiple addresses to discover active devices on a network. By filtering for ICMP type 8 messages in Wireshark, Bran can identify these echo requests, helping to pinpoint ping sweep activities on the network.