Free Fortinet FCSS_SOC_AN-7.4 Practice Exam with Questions & Answers

Understanding the Threat Hunting Data:

The Threat Hunting Monitor in the provided exhibits shows various application services, their usage counts, and data metrics such as sent bytes, average sent bytes, and maximum sent bytes.

The second part of the exhibit lists connection attempts from a specific source IP (10.0.1.10) to a destination IP (8.8.8.8), with repeated "Connection Failed" messages.

Analyzing the Application Services:

DNS is the top application service with a significantly high count (251,400) and notable sent bytes (9.1 MB).

This large volume of DNS traffic is unusual for regular DNS queries and can indicate the presence of DNS tunneling.

DNS Tunneling:

DNS tunneling is a technique used by attackers to bypass security controls by encoding data within DNS queries and responses. This allows them to extract data from the local network without detection.

The high volume of DNS traffic, combined with the detailed metrics, suggests that DNS tunneling might be in use.

Connection Failures to 8.8.8.8:

The repeated connection attempts from the source IP (10.0.1.10) to the destination IP (8.8.8.8) with connection failures can indicate an attempt to communicate with an external server.

Google DNS (8.8.8.8) is often used for DNS tunneling due to its reliability and global reach.

Conclusion:

Given the significant DNS traffic and the nature of the connection attempts, it is reasonable to conclude that DNS tunneling is being used to extract confidential data from the local network.

Why Other Options are Less Likely:

Spearphishing (A): There is no evidence from the provided data that points to spearphishing attempts, such as email logs or phishing indicators.

Reconnaissance (C): The data does not indicate typical reconnaissance activities, such as scanning or probing mail servers.

FTP C&C (D): There is no evidence of FTP traffic or command-and-control communications using FTP in the provided data.

References:

SANS Institute: "DNS Tunneling: How to Detect Data Exfiltration and Tunneling Through DNS Queries" SANS DNS Tunneling

OWASP: "DNS Tunneling" OWASP DNS Tunneling

By analyzing the provided threat hunting data, it is evident that DNS tunneling is being used to exfiltrate data, indicating a sophisticated method of extracting confidential information from the network.

Overview of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are pieces of evidence that suggest a system may have been compromised. These can include unusual network traffic patterns, the presence of known malicious files, or other suspicious activities.

FortiAnalyzer's Role: FortiAnalyzer aggregates logs from various Fortinet devices to provide comprehensive visibility and analysis of network events. It uses these logs to identify potential IoCs and compromised hosts.

Relevant Log Types:

DNS Filter Logs:

DNS requests are a common vector for malware communication. Analyzing DNS filter logs helps in identifying suspicious domain queries, which can indicate malware attempting to communicate with command and control (C2) servers.

Understanding the Issue:

The custom event handler for detecting SMTP reconnaissance activities is generating a large number of events.

This high volume of events is overwhelming the notification system, leading to potential alert fatigue and inefficiency in incident response.

Event Handler Configuration:

Event handlers are configured to trigger alerts based on specific criteria.

The frequency and volume of these alerts can be controlled by adjusting the trigger conditions.

Possible Solutions:

A. Increase the trigger count so that it identifies and reduces the count triggered by a particular group:

By increasing the trigger count, you ensure that the event handler only generates alerts after a higher threshold of activity is detected.

This reduces the number of events generated and helps prevent overwhelming the notification system.

Selected as it effectively manages the volume of generated events.

B. Disable the custom event handler because it is not working as expected:

Disabling the event handler is not a practical solution as it would completely stop monitoring for SMTP reconnaissance activities.

Not selected as it does not address the issue of fine-tuning the event generation.

C. Decrease the time range that the custom event handler covers during the attack:

Reducing the time range might help in some cases, but it could also lead to missing important activities if the attack spans a longer period.

Not selected as it could lead to underreporting of significant events.

D. Increase the log field value so that it looks for more unique field values when it creates the event:

Adjusting the log field value might refine the event criteria, but it does not directly control the volume of alerts.

Not selected as it is not the most effective way to manage event volume.

Implementation Steps:

Step 1: Access the event handler configuration in FortiAnalyzer.

Step 2: Locate the trigger count setting within the custom event handler for SMTP reconnaissance.

Step 3: Increase the trigger count to a higher value that balances alert sensitivity and volume.

Step 4: Save the configuration and monitor the event generation to ensure it aligns with expected levels.

Conclusion:

By increasing the trigger count, you can effectively reduce the number of events generated by the custom event handler, preventing the notification system from being overwhelmed.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on Event Handlers and Configuration FortiAnalyzer Administration Guide

Best Practices for Event Management Fortinet Knowledge Base

By increasing the trigger count in the custom event handler, you can manage the volume of generated events and prevent the notification system from being overwhelmed.

Understanding Automation Processes in FortiAnalyzer:

FortiAnalyzer can automate responses to detected security events, such as running commands on FortiGate devices.

Analyzing the Customer Requirement:

The customer wants to run a CLI command on FortiGate to block predefined URLs when a botnet C&C server IP is detected.

This requires an automated response triggered by a specific event.

Evaluating the Options:

Option A:Playbooks orchestrate complex workflows but are not typically used for direct event-triggered automation processes.

Option B:Data selectors filter logs based on criteria but do not initiate automation processes.

Option C:Event handlers can be configured to detect specific events (such as detecting a botnet C&C server IP) and trigger automation stitches to execute predefined actions.

Option D:Connectors facilitate communication between FortiAnalyzer and other systems but are not the primary mechanism for initiating automation based on log events.

Conclusion:

To start the automation process when a botnet C&C server IP is detected, you must use anEvent handlerin FortiAnalyzer.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on Event Handlers and Automation Stitches in FortiAnalyzer.

Best Practices for Configuring Automated Responses in FortiAnalyzer.

Requirement Analysis:

The objective is to inventory all software and applications running on all Windows devices within the organization.

This inventory must be comprehensive and accurate to pass the security audit.

Key Components:

FortiClient EMS (Endpoint Management Server):

FortiClient EMS provides centralized management of endpoint security, including software and application inventory on Windows devices.

It allows administrators to monitor, manage, and report on all endpoints protected by FortiClient.

Connector Options:

FortiClient EMS:

Best suited for managing and reporting on endpoint software and applications.

Provides detailed inventory reports for all managed endpoints.

Selected as it directly addresses the requirement of taking inventory of software and applications on Windows devices.

ServiceNow:

Primarily a service management platform.

While it can be used for asset management, it is not specifically tailored for endpoint software inventory.

Not selected as it does not provide direct endpoint inventory management.

FortiCASB:

Focuses on cloud access security and monitoring SaaS applications.

Not applicable for managing or inventorying endpoint software.

Not selected as it is not related to endpoint software inventory.

Local Host:

Refers to handling events and logs within FortiAnalyzer itself.

Not specific enough for detailed endpoint software inventory.

Not selected as it does not provide the required endpoint inventory capabilities.

Implementation Steps:

Step 1: Ensure all Windows devices are managed by FortiClient and connected to FortiClient EMS.

Step 2: Use FortiClient EMS to collect and report on the software and applications installed on these devices.

Step 3: Generate inventory reports from FortiClient EMS to meet the audit requirements.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on FortiClient EMS FortiClient EMS Administration Guide

By using the FortiClient EMS connector, you can effectively inventory all software and applications on Windows devices, ensuring compliance with the security audit requirements.

Understanding the Playbook and its Components:

The exhibit shows a playbook in which an event trigger starts actions upon detecting a malicious file.

The initial tasks in the playbook includeCREATE_INCIDENTandGET_EVENTS.

Analysis of Current Tasks:

EVENT_TRIGGER STARTER: This initiates the playbook when a specified event (malicious file detection) occurs.

CREATE_INCIDENT: This task likely creates a new incident in the incident management system for tracking and response.

GET_EVENTS: This task retrieves the event details related to the detected malicious file.

Objective of the Next Task:

The next logical step after creating an incident and retrieving event details is to update the incident with the event data, ensuring all relevant information is attached to the incident record.

This helps SOC analysts by consolidating all pertinent details within the incident record, facilitating efficient tracking and response.

Evaluating the Options:

Option A:Update Asset and Identityis not directly relevant to attaching event data to the incident.

Option B:Attach Data to Incidentsounds plausible but typically, updating an incident involves more comprehensive changes including status updates, adding comments, and other data modifications.

Option C:Run Reportis irrelevant in this context as the goal is to update the incident with event data.

Option D:Update Incidentis the most suitable action for incorporating event data into the existing incident record.

Conclusion:

The next task in the playbook should be to update the incident with the event data to ensure the incident reflects all necessary information for further investigation and response.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on Playbook Creation and Incident Management.

Best Practices for Automating Incident Response in SOC Operations.

Understanding the Playbook Configuration:

The playbook named "Update Asset and Identity Database" is designed to update the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database with endpoint and user information.

The exhibit shows the playbook with three main components: ON_SCHEDULE STARTER, GET_ENDPOINTS, and UPDATE_ASSET_AND_IDENTITY.

Analyzing the Components:

ON_SCHEDULE STARTER:This component indicates that the playbook is triggered on a schedule, not on-demand.

GET_ENDPOINTS:This action retrieves information about endpoints, suggesting it interacts with an endpoint management system.

UPDATE_ASSET_AND_IDENTITY:This action updates the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database with the retrieved information.

Evaluating the Options:

Option A:The actions shown in the playbook are standard local actions that can be executed by the FortiAnalyzer, indicating the use of a local connector.

Option B:There is no indication that the playbook uses a FortiMail connector, as the tasks involve endpoint and identity management, not email.

Option C:The playbook is using an "ON_SCHEDULE" trigger, which contradicts the description of an on-demand trigger.

Option D:The action "GET_ENDPOINTS" suggests integration with an endpoint management system, likely FortiClient EMS, which manages endpoints and retrieves information from them.

Conclusion:

The playbook is configured to use a local connector for its actions.

It interacts with FortiClient EMS to get endpoint information and update the FortiAnalyzer Asset and Identity database.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on Playbook Actions and Connectors.

FortiAnalyzer and FortiClient EMS Integration Guides.

Understanding the Playbook and its Components:

The exhibit shows the status of a playbook named "DOS attack" and its associated tasks.

The playbook is designed to execute a series of tasks upon detecting a DoS attack event.

Analysis of Playbook Tasks:

Attach_Data_To_Incident:Task ID placeholder_8fab0102, status is "upstream_failed," meaning it did not execute properly due to a previous task's failure.

Get Events:Task ID placeholder_fa2a573c, status is "success."

Create SMTP Enumeration incident:Task ID placeholder_3db75c0a, status is "failed."

Reviewing Raw Logs:

The error log shows aValueError: invalid literal for int() with base 10: '10.200.200.100'.

This error indicates that the task attempted to convert a string (the IP address '10.200.200.100') to an integer, which is not possible.

Identifying the Source of the Error:

The error occurs in the file "incident_operator.py," specifically in theexecutemethod.

This suggests that the task "Create SMTP Enumeration incident" is the one causing the issue because it failed to process the data type correctly.

Conclusion:

The failure of the playbook is due to the "Create SMTP Enumeration incident" task receiving a string value (an IP address) when it expects an integer value. This mismatch in data types leads to the error.

References:

Fortinet Documentation on Playbook and Task Configuration.

Python error handling documentation for understandingValueError.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Overview:

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a structured approach for managing and mitigating cybersecurity risks. Incident handling is divided into several phases to systematically address and resolve incidents.

Incident Handling Phases:

Preparation: Establishing and maintaining an incident response capability.

Detection and Analysis: Identifying and investigating suspicious activities to confirm an incident.

Containment, Eradication, and Recovery:

Containment: Limiting the impact of the incident.

Eradication: Removing the root cause of the incident.

Recovery: Restoring systems to normal operation.

Containment Phase:

The primary goal of the containment phase is to prevent the incident from spreading and causing further damage.

Quarantining a Compromised Host:

Quarantining involves isolating the compromised host from the rest of the network to prevent adversaries from moving laterally and causing more harm.

Techniques include network segmentation, disabling network interfaces, and applying access controls.