Free ECCouncil ICS-SCADA Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 2

The third generation of ICS/SCADA systems is considered distributed. This generation features systems that are networked and interconnected, typically using a variety of standard communication protocols. This distribution allows for broader connectivity and integration with other systems, enhancing operational flexibility and efficiency but also introducing more vectors for potential cyber threats.References:

Joseph Weiss, "Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats".

The third generation of ICS/SCADA systems is considered distributed. These systems emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s and were designed to overcome the limitations of earlier generations by leveraging networked architectures.

Distributed Architecture: Third-generation systems distributed control functions across multiple interconnected devices and systems, providing greater scalability and flexibility.

Network Integration: These systems integrated more extensively with IT networks, allowing for remote monitoring and control.

Standard Protocols: Adoption of standard communication protocols (e.g., Ethernet, TCP/IP) facilitated interoperability and integration with other systems.

Enhanced Redundancy: Improved fault tolerance and redundancy were implemented to ensure system reliability.

Due to these features, the third generation is known as the distributed generation.

References

"SCADA Systems," SCADAHacker, SCADA Generations.

E. Knapp, J. Langill, "Industrial Network Security," Syngress, 2014.

IEC 62443 defines multiple security levels (SLs) tailored to address different types of threats and attackers in industrial control systems.

Security Level 4 (SL4) is designed to protect against sophisticated attacks by adversaries such as hacktivists or terrorists. SL4 involves threats that are targeted with specific intent against the organization, using advanced skills and means.

This level assumes that the adversary is capable of sustained and focused efforts with significant resources, including state-level actors or well-funded groups, aiming at causing widespread disruption or damage.

References

IEC 62443-3-3: System security requirements and security levels.

"Industrial Network Security: Securing Critical Infrastructure Networks for Smart Grid, SCADA, and Other Industrial Control Systems," by Eric Knapp.

In the context of monitoring and alerts within cybersecurity, the classification of alerts includes true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives.

A false negative is considered the most dangerous type of alert because it occurs when an actual security threat is present but the monitoring system fails to detect and alert it. This allows malicious activities to occur undetected, potentially leading to significant damage or data loss.

The risk with false negatives is that they provide a false sense of security, assuming that systems are secure while in reality, they are compromised.

References

"Security and Network Monitoring Basics," Cisco Systems.

"Understanding Alert Classifications in Cybersecurity," Journal of Information Security.

To determine the correct Security Association (SA) in the context of IPsec, several elements are required:

SPI (Security Parameter Index): Uniquely identifies the SA.

Partner IP address: The address of the endpoint with which the SA is established.

Protocol: Specifies the type of security protocol used (e.g., AH or ESP). All these components collectively define and identify a specific SA for secure communication between parties.References:

RFC 4301, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA networks typically operate in environments where the available bandwidth is limited. They are often characterized by:

Low processing threshold: ICS/SCADA devices generally have limited processing capabilities due to their specialized and often legacy nature.

Legacy systems: Many ICS/SCADA systems include older technology that might not support newer security protocols or high-speed data transfer.

Weak network stack: These systems may have incomplete or less robust network stacks that can be susceptible to specific types of network attacks.

High bandwidth networks are not typical of ICS/SCADA environments, as these systems do not usually require or support high-speed data transmission due to their operational requirements and the older technology often used in such environments.

References

"Navigating the Challenges of Industrial Control Systems," by ISA-99 Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security.

"Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems," by the Department of Homeland Security.

In ICS/SCADA systems, the typical priority hierarchy of the IT Security Model components places Availability and Integrity above Confidentiality. This prioritization is due to the critical nature of operational continuity and data accuracy in industrial control systems, where system downtime or incorrect data can lead to significantoperational disruptions or safety issues. Confidentiality, while important, is often considered of lesser priority compared to ensuring systems are operational (Availability) and data is accurate (Integrity).References:

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security".

IEC 62443 is a series of standards designed to secure Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). It provides a framework for implementing cybersecurity measures in the context of industrial environments.

The Defense in Depth (DiD) approach outlined in IEC 62443 involves multiple layers of security measures to protect industrial networks. This method ensures that if one layer fails, others are in place to continue protection.

Specifically, the IEC 62443 framework describes six fundamental steps in setting up a Defense in Depth strategy, covering aspects from physical security to network segmentation and device hardening.

References

International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC 62443 Series.

"Understanding IEC 62443 for Industrial Cybersecurity," by ISA99 Committee.

The IEC 62443 standard outlines a comprehensive framework for securing industrial automation and control systems (IACS). The Defense in Depth concept within this standard includes six steps designed to ensure robust security.

Step 1: Identification and Authentication Control (IAC): Ensuring only authorized users and devices can access the system.

Step 2: Use Control (UC): Managing permissions and access controls to restrict actions users can perform.

Step 3: System Integrity (SI): Ensuring the system remains in a trustworthy state, protected from unauthorized changes.

Step 4: Data Confidentiality (DC): Protecting sensitive data from unauthorized access and disclosure.

Step 5: Restricted Data Flow (RDF): Controlling and monitoring data flows to prevent unauthorized data transmission.

Step 6: Timely Response to Events (TRE): Implementing mechanisms to detect, respond to, and recover from security incidents.

These steps collectively form the Defense in Depth strategy prescribed by IEC 62443.

References

"IEC 62443 - Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security," International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC 62443.

"Defense in Depth," Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Defense in Depth.

The WannaCry ransomware utilizes the $IPC (Inter-Process Communication) share to connect with and infect target machines. This hidden network share supports the operation of named pipes, which facilitates the communication necessary for WannaCry to execute its payload across networks.References:

CISA Analysis Report, "WannaCry Ransomware".

WannaCry ransomware uses the SMB (Server Message Block) protocol to propagate through networks and connect to target systems. Specifically, it exploits a vulnerability in SMBv1, known as EternalBlue (MS17-010).

IPC Share: The $IPC (Inter-Process Communication) share is a hidden administrative share used for inter-process communication. WannaCry uses this share to gain access to other machines on the network.

SMB Exploitation: By exploiting the SMB vulnerability, WannaCry can establish a connection to the $IPC share, allowing it to execute the payload on the target machine.

Propagation: Once connected, it deploys the DoublePulsar backdoor and then spreads the ransomware payload.

Given these details, the correct answer is $IPC.

References

"WannaCry Ransomware Attack," Wikipedia,WannaCry.

"MS17-010: Security Update for Windows SMB Server," Microsoft,MS17-010.

TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is a connection-oriented protocol used in the majority of internet communications.

Connection-oriented protocols like TCP require a connection to be established between the communicating devices before data is transmitted. This ensures reliable and ordered delivery of data.

TCP manages this by establishing a handshake mechanism (TCP three-way handshake) to set up the connection prior to transmitting data and properly terminating the connection once the communication session has completed.

References

"TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 1: The Protocols" by W. Richard Stevens.

Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol," RFC 793.

The Wayback Machine is an internet service provided by the Internet Archive that allows users to see archived versions of web pages across time, enabling them to browse past versions of a website as it appeared on specific dates.

It captures and stores snapshots of web pages, making it an invaluable tool for accessing the historical state of a website or recovering content that has since been changed or deleted.

Other options like Google Cache may also show snapshots of web pages, but the Wayback Machine is dedicated to this purpose and holds a vast archive of historical web data.

References

Internet Archive:https://archive.org

"Using the Wayback Machine," Internet Archive Help Center.