Free Zscaler ZDTA Practice Exam with Questions & Answers

When a SAML Identity Provider (IdP) returns an assertion containing device attributes, these attributes are first consumed by the Zero Trust Exchange component. This component uses the device attributes for policy creation and enforcement decisions, integrating identity and device posture information to make dynamic access decisions.

The ATP workflow focuses on protecting users from security threats such as phishing, malware, and malicious URLs through mechanisms including IPS coverage on client and server sides, categorization of URLs (especially newly registered domains), and prevention of risky file downloads like password-protected zip files. However, reporting on network performance issues such as high latency on a Teams call caused by low WiFi signal is outside the scope of ATP. This type of issue relates to digital experience or network performance monitoring, not threat protection.

The graph in the Security Alerts section displays the Top 5 Threats by Systems Impacted, highlighting which threats have affected the most endpoints over the selected time period.

The Cloud Firewall includes Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities that detect protocol evasion techniques where applications try to communicate over non-standard ports to bypass firewall controls. Once detected, the traffic is sent to the appropriate inspection engines for further handling and mitigation. This ensures that evasive traffic does not bypass security controls.

Valid criteria for Access Policy Rules in ZPA include Group Membership, ZIA Risk Score, Domain Joined, and Certificate Trust. These attributes allow granular policy decisions based on user identity, device posture, and risk context.

Options including password are invalid as passwords are not used as policy criteria; similarly, SNI and Branch Connector Group are more relevant to other controls. The study guide lists these user and device attributes explicitly as policy criteria within ZPA access policies.

SCIM is optional for ZIA user provisioning - you can onboard users via manual CSV import, SAML attributes, or other identity integrations without implementing SCIM.

Zscaler Advanced Firewall supports DNS Tunnel and DNS Application Control, capabilities that are not available in the Standard Firewall. This enhances detection and control of DNS-based threats and allows granular enforcement over DNS queries and responses to prevent data exfiltration and command and control activities.

During authentication to a private web application, the SAML assertion is delivered to the service provider via a Form POST through the browser. This standard SAML mechanism involves the browser receiving the assertion from the IdP and then POSTing it to the service provider to complete the authentication flow.

When tunnels (GRE/IPSec) are already configured from trusted locations (like branch offices), the recommended setting is “Tunnel v2.0” for on-trusted networks and “None” for off-trusted. This ensures that while on a corporate network, the Zscaler Client Connector uses the pre-established tunnels, but falls back to direct or other secure methods (like VPN or ZCC tunnel) when off-trusted. This aligns with Zscaler's best practices for hybrid deployment.

When the Zscaler Client Connector launches, it initially interacts with the Zscaler Central Authority portal. This portal provides the Client Connector with information about the user's domain and the configured identity provider (IdP). This interaction allows the Client Connector to direct the user to the appropriate authentication endpoint and apply the correct access policies.

The study guide emphasizes the role of the Central Authority in managing user domain information and identity provider details for authentication flows.